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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a series of case studies that chronicle the reorganization (decentralization,
product/market restructuring) of a Public Works Department on board a Naval Air Station. The
organization, environment, events, and personnel involved in the development, implementation, and
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This thesis records the organization, environment, events,
and personnel involved in the development, implementation, and
management of a major RIF (reduction in force) and
reorganization of the Public Works Department (PWD) aboard
Naval Air Station Kensington (NAS Kensington) . The
information is presented in the format of three case studies
that cover a period of three years, and are analyzed in view
of organization and management theories.
B . METHODOLOGY
A case study is a description of an actual situation faced
by a real organization that concentrates on one or more chief
issues, decisions, or problems [Ref. l:p. 3]. The use of
cases, particularly as an educational tool, is an effective
method to aid students in learning problem-solving and
decision making skills [Ref. 2:p. 3].
This thesis is written as a teaching tool. The
department's predicament, environment, and personnel are
depicted so as to present a situation where students are able
to identify the problem(s), propose alternative courses of
action and recommend solutions. In order to simplify the
search for facts, problems, and solutions the data are
presented in chronological order using a narrative format.
The location of the Public Works Department, and the names of
the personnel involved have been changed for purposes of
confidentiality.
C. BACKGROUND
Our Nation's Defense Department is facing a severe
reduction of resources in the next few years. More than ever
before we will be called to do more with less. Many of us
wonder how that is possible but none-the-less we recognize it
is reality. One of the areas soon to be called upon is that
of maintaining our aging shore facilities in a mission ready
status.
It is the officers of the Civil Engineer Corps,
specifically those of the public works activities (departments
and centers) , who are responsible for the upkeep of our
Nation's Naval facilities. It has been my experience that
public works activities suffer from a poor reputation for
service and work in an environment of work overload and
underfunding. Without an adjustment of some type to the
system, the current environment will only exacerbate these
conditions.
The Public Works Officer at Naval Air Station Kensington,
CDR Alexander, chose to take the offensive. His organization
as most others was experiencing slow response times, poor
workmanship, and was involved primarily in "fire fighting"
(i.e., crisis management instead of preventive maintenance).
His response to his current situation and to the cutbacks on
the horizon was reorganization utilizing decentralization and
strategic management principles.
Within a few months after reorganization, however, OSD
released a study (the Defense Management Report Decision) that
stipulates consolidation as the most economical method of
providing facilities engineering services. NAS Kensington now
faces incorporation with Public Works Center Edgewater (PWC
Edgewater) . If this occurs PWD Kensington will cease to
exist. The provision of utilities and virtually all facility
maintenance and repair will be "contracted" from PWC
Edgewater.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The principal question addresses the best way to
reorganize given a changing environment. Two secondary
questions address what factors or inputs should be considered
when reorganizing and who should be involved, that is should
change come from the top or bottom of an organization.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
Following this introductory chapter, the thesis is
organized into four chapters. Chapter II discusses the case
methodology, it value and significance. Chapter III contains
three case studies documenting the development, decisions, and
ir.pierer.tatior. of the reorganization. Case I is primarily
background, concentrating on the conditions and decisions
Leading to reorganization. Case II looks at the
lapl«»Clltation of the change and the organization as it is
currently operating. Case III entails the departure of the
present PWO , and the impending change once again facing PWD
nam Kensington (i.e. , input from OSD requiring consolidation)
.
Chapter IV is an analysis of each case. Chapter V is a





This chapter addresses case methodology. Also discussed are
the benefits and disadvantages of using the case method for
teaching purposes.
B. CASE STUDIES FOR TEACHING PURPOSES
There are two factors present in virtually any learning
situation, the knowledge to be learned and the process of
learning. The learning process is the method by which the
student makes a decision or solves a problem. A student's
ability to deal with the reality of life outside the classroom
is contingent on both factors. [Ref. 3:p. 1]
Case studies present real life situations which provide
students with a wide range of experiences to compare and
evaluate. There are basically three types of cases used for
teaching purposes: an issue case, an appraisal case, and a
problem set. An "issue case" is a description of a real world
situation, problem, or event in which the student is asked to
develop and defend recommendations. In an "appraisal case"
the decision has already been made or the problem solved. The
student evaluates the decision and assesses its potential
strengths and weaknesses. The third type of case is one that
does not provide the necessary detailed information on the
organization involved and thus is merely a "problem set" which
requires only the direct application of course material.
[Ref. 4: p. 2]
The purpose of teaching with case studies is to impart to
the student the ability to "act intelligently, rationally, and
morally in a business situation." [Ref. l:p. 4] Exposure to
numerous case studies provides a myriad of "experiences" from
which to draw if ever faced with a similar situation. "Case
studies are valuable [for] teaching students the habits of
diagnosing problems, analyzing, and evaluating alternatives
and formulating workable plans of action." [Ref. 5:p. 56]
Traditionally, problems presented in the classroom
environment have only one correct answer and corresponding
methodology [Ref. 3:p. 2]. Life, though, is a compilation of
changing situations with incomplete or irrelevant information
on which decisions must be based. Generally, there is more
than one correct decision or solution. "The very basis of the
case method is that there are few standard situations or
standard solutions...." [Ref. 4: p. 1] It is also important
for a student to realize and experience that decisions are not
made solely from an analysis of the facts. "The decision is
a political process. .. involving power and influence." [Ref.
6:p. 2]
Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, Ret., strongly supports
the use of case studies in military classrooms. He says,
"Many of the education programs, are simply cramming officers'
heads with facts rather than helping them to develop the
skills to deal with difficult problems of leadership,
strategy, and management. . . . The case study method will help
prepare students for the time when they rise to the level
where they really have to make decisions for our country."
[Ref. 7:p. 1]
C. BENEFITS OF CASE STUDIES
'The essential fact that makes the case system... an
educational method of the greatest power is that the
student [is]... an active rather than a passive
participant. ' —Wallace B. Donham, Dean of the Harvard
Business School, 1919-1942. [Ref. l:p. 7]
In order to be an effective, active participant in both
the classroom and in the business world, the student must be
equipped with the necessary "tools." Cases impart action
abilities to students by providing practice in decision
making. [Ref. l:p. 4] Undoubtedly anyone well versed in the
use of cases for teaching could add to or subtract from a
proposed list of action skills. The skills described below
are drawn from a list compiled by Mr. Alfred C. Edge in his
book The Guide to Case Analysis and Reporting .
Skill one—Think clearly in complex, ambiguous situations.
Frequently the decision-making information provided in a case
is deficient, obscure, and/or contradictory. This is an
obvious contrast to that of a skillfully worded, coherent, and
consistent textbook exercise that is structured to produce
"the answer." It is important since problems in management
and administration are laden with these less than perfect
circur.srances. "Successful experiences with cases give
students the practice and confidence necessary for clear,
intensive thinking in ambiguous situations where no one right
answer exists." [Ref. l:p. 5]
Skill two--Recognize the significance of information.
Studies of modern management have confirmed what any manager
already knows. As a manager, one is subjected to large
quantities of information. A manager's ability to define
problems and solutions is consistent with one's ability to
classify extraneous, unimportant, useful, and critical
information.
Skill three--Devise reasonable, consistent, creative
action plans. The majority of teaching case studies require
the student to detail a realistic, consistent, and creative
plan of action, not a ridiculous or inexecutable solution.
The various elements of the plan are not contradictory or
reliant upon conflicting case evidence. Finally, the plan is
"creative" in that it steps beyond the given data.
Skill four--Determine vital missing information. A
decision maker must be able to discern if the information at
hand is sufficient or if further facts and data are needed.
A student practices this by solving problems with the
information presented in the case, outside resources and
practical experience, and by identifying any missing
8
information that is critical to the preparation of an action
plan.
Skill five—Communicate orally in groups. The capacity to
listen attentively, to clearly express one's views, to
integrate other's views into one's position, and perhaps even
to persuade others to one's point of view are a must for the
successful manager. These skills are a central part of
learning by cases and are reinforced by both in-class and
small group discussions.
Skill six—Write clear, forceful, convincing reports, in
addition to effective oral communication, it is imperative
that a manger (and even his staff) be able to effectively
convey their thoughts in writing. "The best way to improve
one's writing skills is to write; hence, the usefulness of the
case report." [Ref. l:p. 6]
Skill seven—Apply personal values to organizational
decisions. Today's managers, more than ever before, are
forced to make decisions that affect company profits,
government expenses, and both individual and public interest.
The subject of ethics is essential in a professional
education. A student's ethical knowledge and maturity is
sharpened by stating and defending his viewpoint in case
discussions.
Skill eight—Guide student's careers. By being exposed to
a wide variety of actual organizational situations, the
student gains valuable insight into the function of many job
9
positions. Students can use these experiences to assess their
own interests, aptitude, and limitations, and thereby make a
more knowledgeable career choice.
Just as important, the case method of teaching is
intellectually challenging for instructors and meets their
research needs. The faculty and the "world of practice" are
connected as the instructor develops new cases. "It
encourages them to be in touch with their professional
counterparts, maintaining a dialogue that explores current
problems and anticipates future issues." [Ref. 8: p. 25]
D. DISADVANTAGES OF CASE STUDIES
'Practically no problem in life... ever presents itself as
a case on which a decision can be taken. What appears at
first sight to be elements of the problem rarely are the
important or relevant things. They are at best symptoms.
And often the most visible symptoms are the least
revealing ones.' — Peter Drucker [Ref. l:p. 29]
There is an initial period of dissatisfaction when
students are first exposed to case teaching. The case method
places significant demands on students, and until a student
begins to understand the purpose of these demands,
difficulties and dissatisfactions may arise. As students
become comfortable with the challenges of the case method,
they find cases help them learn and improve their action
skills, and the initial dissatisfaction diminishes. [Ref. l:p.
10]
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Disadvantage one—Cases have no unique answer. Most cases
do not have a single correct solution. In fact there may be
several feasible, consistent, and effective plans of action.
Some students find it difficult to accept that a problem may
have more than one "right" answer. Because many situations in
actual organizations consist of numerous unknowns, many
interrelated factors, unquantif iable goals, and behavioral
considerations the best anyone can strive for is to produce an
action plan that is consistent, based on facts, thoroughly
detailed, and justifiable. There may be several such
solutions. [Ref. l:p. 10]
Disadvantage two—Information is ambiguous and
contradictory. The most realistic case possible is
constructed based upon information obtained by reviewing
company records, by interviewing key personnel, and by
observing the business in action. Due to the nature of the
information, such as the biased views of executives and the
fallible nature of people, the information conveyed in the
case may indeed be ambiguous and contradictory. The case
method offers the student a chance to deal with the
uncertainties and inconsistencies found in many real issues.
[Ref. l:pp. 10-11]
Disadvantage three—The issue is not expressly stated. In
general, cases are a narrative of events in chronological
order which lead to a description of an organization at a
particular point in time. The student is tasked with
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identifying the problem (s) and determining a proper course of
action. Due to the fear of identifying an insignificant
problem or symptom that is not central to the case, students
prefer an exact problem definition. The process of
identifying the problem, though, is nonetheless one of the
important action skills (skill two) taught by cases. [Ref.
l:p. 11]
Disadvantage four—Information is redundant and
irrelevant. A case is a condensed depiction of an
organization and its situation; it is not merely a
summarization of facts that pertain to a specific decision.
The student learns how to differentiate between critical,
useful, unimportant, and extraneous data (skill two). [Ref.
l:p. 11]
Disadvantage five—Note taking is difficult. Students who
are use to taking numerous notes during a lecture attempt to
do the same during an in-class case study discussion. This is
unnecessary and often counter-productive because the attention
of the note taker is directed away from the class discussion.
Typically the resulting notes are uninformative. It is
useful, however, to take selective notes concerning useful
case analysis and other important points. [Ref. l:p. 12]
Disadvantage six—Case teaching is inefficient. Indeed
lectures are efficient and an economical use of both the
instructor's time and energy. The case method intentionally
starts with a different purpose and finishes with an
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altogether distinctive result. [Ref . 7:p. 23] The whole point
of the case study is to apply theories and principles (often
learned in a lecture) to real situations. [Ref. l:p. 12]
Although the logical organization of subject matter is the
proper goal of learning, the logic of the subject cannot
be truly meaningful to the learner without his
psychological and personal involvement in exploration.
'Only by wrestling with the conditions of the problem at
hand, seeking and finding his own way out, does he
think. ... If he cannot devise his own solution (not of
course, in isolation but in correspondence with the
teacher and other pupils) and find his own way out he will
not learn, not even if he can recite some correct answer
with one hundred percent accuracy.' [Ref. 8: p. 24]
E. METHODOLOGY OF THESIS
A case study "treats people as the observable agents
through which the unobservable forces of the organization
act." [Ref. 6:p. 9] The subject of this theses is a series of
case studies that chronicle the events of a major Public Works
Department over a three year period. It describes the
reorganization of the department (from centralized to
decentralized) . The case series also describes the
leadership, planning, implementation, personnel issues, and
future changes as they relate to the reorganization process.
Sources of information included written documentation and
personal interviews. Some supplemental information was
obtained over the telephone. Written documentation included
a customer survey and its results (written and conducted by
PWD)
,
departmental documentation such as a command
presentation, and various pieces of correspondence.
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Interviewed were personnel, both military and civilian, from
throughout the department's chain of command. Interviews were
conducted by both myself and the Administrative Officer. My
interviews were conducted over a period of three days, and
were tape recorded and then transcribed at a latter date. I
interviewed the PWO, the APWO, three Division Directors, the
Emergency/Service's Dispatcher, and the PWZ Cr-ptrcller Budget
Analyst. The Administrative Officer interviewed tr.e General
Foreman, the three Shop Foresail, the three F&E's (Planners and
Estimators), two Inspectors, the Production Controller, one
Division Director, and five workers. Her interviews took
place over a period of approximately two weeks and the
comments were noted in writing at the time of the interview.
The potential for bias does exist though, as the choice of
interviewees was net based or. any type of statistical method
of sampling. The personnel I interviewed were upper and
riddle management and were "chosen" based on who was available
(i.e., everyone available was interviewed). rhe personnel
interviewed by the Administrative Officer had already been
selected and interviewed. Because of tine constraints,
convenience, and the prevention of duplication of effort, the




Our Navy today consists of approximately 500 ships, 2500
small watercraft, 7000 aircraft, and a work force of more than
one million men and women (officers, enlisted personnel, and
civilian employees) . The Navy projects the world-wide
presence of the United States. In order to support this
mission, the Navy operates and maintains a multi-billion
dollar shore establishment.
This shore establishment consists of shipyards, naval
stations, homes, schools, streets, parks, hospitals, research
centers, airports, harbors, radio stations, railroads, utility
and communication systems, and factories.
The Navy Civil Engineer Corps (CEC) has been given the
responsibility for planning, designing, constructing, and
maintaining these shore facilities. CEC officers serving as
Public Works Officers are tasked with keeping these facilities
well-maintained and provided with utilities so they continue
to function efficiently.
A Public Works Officer (PWO) is comparable to a city
engineer. Depending upon the size of the activity, the PWO
may manage a work force of 10 to 400 personnel engaged in the
design, construction, maintenance and repair of facilities;
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utilities systems operation and maintenance; operation and
maintenance of transportation equipment; and family housing
maintenance and administration. Public Works Officers are
also tasked to manage resources, plan their allocation and
analyze the entire operation for future improvements.
The three cases contained in this thesis involve the
Public Works Department of NAS Kensington located in San
Diego, California, specifically its function of maintenance
and repair of the station facilities, and the actions of the
Public Works Officer, CDR Alexander. Case study one covers
CDR Alexander's first few months on board as PWO, and the
circumstances and actions leading to a major reorganization of
the Public Works Department. Case study two looks at the
implementation of the reorganization, and the department as it
is currently functioning. In case three the reader sees the
departure of CDR Alexander, and the impending change once
again facing PWD, NAS Kensington.
B. CASE STUDY ONE—LET THE COMPETITION BEGIN
1 . Background
"Welcome aboard Commander." CDR Alexander was warmly
greeted by his staff as he arrived to assume the duty of
Public Works Officer (PWO) at Naval Air Station Kensington
(NAS Kensington)
.
The Commander being a "hit the ground running" type of
a guy was anxious to get down to business, and called his
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Assistant Public Works Officer (APWO) , LCDR Patrick, into his
office for a run down on the organization and its operations.
LCDR Patrick was prepared for such a short notice request and
proceeded to brief the Commander.
2. Organization
To carry out its mission, the Public Works Department
(PWD) has two officers (the PWO and the APWO)
, 14 enlisted
Seabees (who manage and execute the station Self-Help Program 1
and provide off-hours emergency service and transportation)
,
and over 170 civilian personnel. The Department is divided
into various divisions including housing, transportation,
maintenance and utilities, contracts, administration, finance,
engineering, environmental, FMED (Facility Maintenance
Engineering) , and Self-Help. The organizational structure and
a list of billets are shown in Exhibit 1-1.
The work request process and the basic
responsibilities of the organizational components most closely
involved in the maintenance and repair of the base facilities
are outlined in Exhibit 1-2.
PWD is the largest department of NAS Kensington, with
the possible exception of the Supply Department. NAS
1 Self-Help is a program that is set up to provide technical
advisors (Seabees) and materials to assist a customer in the
performance of MWR and "training" type projects (e.g., building a
platform on the parade field or building a small footbridge across
a creek on base.
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Kensington has approximately 15 departments including MWR,
AIMD, and Weapons.
Also on board are some 17 tenant commands. The
largest of which is Commander, Fighter Airborne Early Warning
Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMFIT). Others include Navy
Fighter Weapons School, Naval Air Reserve Center, and Naval
Telecommunications Center. While these tenant commands are
not in the NAS chain of command, the facilities they occupy
are property of the station and therefore require the services
of PWD (see Exhibit 1-3).
NAS Kensington is the only naval activity in the San Diego
area with its own Public Works Department (facility and real
estate statistics are found in Exhibit 1-4) . The Navy Public
Works Center based at Naval Station Edgewater (approximately
30 miles from NAS Kensington) provides maintenance and utility
service to all other San Diego bases.
In addition to his Public Works responsibilities, CDR
Alexander serves a second boss, Commander, Southwest Division,
Naval Engineering Command (SWDIV) , as OICC (Officer In Charge
of Construction) . That is, he is the contracting authority
for virtually all construction of the station. Acting as
liaisons with other station staff members, Public Works
Engineering develops the Station's needs and priorities.
Project requests are then submitted via the chain of command
for Congressional approval and funding.
18
Public Works also works with SWDIV on the station's
master plan, environmental issues, real estate, base




"That seems routine enough," stated CDR Alexander as
LCDR Patrick finished his brief. "Now let's discuss any
problems or concerns specific to PWD, NAS Kensington. I am
particularly interested in this package on my desk."
"Yes sir," replied LCDR Patrick. "We are currently in
the final stages of a CA (Commercial Activities - OMB Circular
A-76) study. As you know, sir, the purpose of the CA study is
to determine whether to contract out services or to continue
to provide them "in-house." In order to have a competitive
cost estimate we must establish our Most Efficient
Organization (MEO) (i.e., a streamlined organization that can
still perform its intended mission) ." (For a full explanation
of the OMB A-76 program see Exhibit 1-5.) "The package on
your desk contains the outcome of the last five years, and CDR
Atwood ' s (previous PWO) recommendation for the department's
MEO (Exhibit 1-6) . The deadline for submission of the final
package is only a few months away."
During his first few days on board, CDR Alexander
reviewed his predecessor's recommendations which basically
entailed position downgrades, and mentally noted his
19
observations and concerns. The Commander's initial "gut"
reaction was "This will never cut it. We are sure to lose
most, if not all, of our in-house work to a local contractor."
The position downgrades were a step in the right direction but
the overall organizational structure of the proposed MEO
remained the same as the current organization (i.e., a
functional, centralized, shop structure) . This approach
seemed outdated to CDR Alexander when he compared it to the
organizational structures now found in successful private
businesses (foreign and domestic) and in Naval shipyards.
Perhaps further information was required to better evaluate
the proposed MEO: Was the current PWD organization
functioning well? Were they meeting their customer's needs?
Did the MEO take into account the shrinking pool of blue
collar workers and cross utilization of trades? (Tradesmen
are becoming more difficult to come by as more and more young
people choose white collar or service oriented work.) Were
costs as low as possible? The workers have known since the
first days of the CA study, some five years ago, that some
type of change was coming down the road. They know this
change will most likely mean a RIF (Reduction In Force) . What
has been their reaction to all of this?
With those thoughts in mind the Commander set the
wheels in motion. During the next couple months a customer
survey was created and distributed to the other NAS Kensington
departments and tenant commands (see Exhibit 1-7 for survey
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and tabulated results) ; division directors were tasked to
access their division's status (detailed findings are listed
in Exhibit 1-8) ; and numbers were generated for a dollar and
cents look at the maintenance backlog (Exhibit 1-9) . After
reviewing all of the information CDR Alexander came to the
following conclusions.
• The department is not customer oriented. The two primary
customer concerns are the length of time required to
process and accomplish a work request, and their inability
to obtain the status of a work request once it is in the
system.
• The morale of the workers is low due primarily to the
impending RIF which the employees have been anticipating
for the past five years. In addition employee recognition
is minimal and extremely restrictive. Current station
policy states an employee can only receive a performance
award every two years.
• He is dealing with incompetent middle managers.
• His Environmental Division consists of one person.
Environmental is one of the most politically sensitive and
important areas handled by Public Works.
• The amount of backlog work grew significantly in the
previous three years (FYs 87-89)
.
• The Transportation Division is already organized into
their MEO based on the findings and recommendations of a
1986 Management and Productivity study. They are
operating effectively and efficiently.
CDR Alexander was more convinced than ever that a
change in the proposed MEO was absolutely necessary. The

















































Supvr Eng Tech GS-12
Supvr P&E (General) WN-7
Gen Maint Ops Inspector WG-ll
3 - P&Es (General) WD-8
P&E (Electrical) WD-8














Supvr Civil Eng GS-12
Eng Draftsman GS-ll
Civil Eng GS-ll




Code 184 (Comptroller empl's)




2 - Production Controllers GS-9
Carpentry Branch









Gmd Structures Foreman WS-9
Title
Pest Control Branch
3 - Pest Controllers
Ground/Laborer Branch
2 - Portable Equip Operators
Motor Vehicle Operator






























5 - Boiler Plant Operators
Powered Support Systems





6 - HVAC Mechanics

























































Exhibit l-l (Page 2 of 2)
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BASIC RESPONSIBILITIES
(of divisions involved in the maintenance & repair process]
1. FMED
* Establish and execute an inspection program to continuously inspect facilities
and equipment to determine maintenance and repair needs.
* Develop annual and long range maintenance plans.
* Determine budget requirements for maintenance and minor construction and
make recommendations to the PWO for funding of special maintenance, alteration,
and repair projects.
* Receive, screen, classify, and prioritize all work requests including inspection
reports and emergency/service calls.
* Prepare scoping estimates for jobs that require customer approval and to aid
budgeting and maintenance plan development.
* Prepare detailed job packages including a material list and estimated craft
hours as required.
* Prepare shop load plans and issue work authorizations in accordance with
those plans.
* Provide customer liaison on facilities maintenance and advise customers of
job status.
* Record and report real property inventory data.
2. MAINTENANCE AND UTILITIES DIVISION
* Perform maintenance, repair, alteration, or minor construction of buildings,
structures, and utilities systems.
* Plan, schedule, direct and coordinate the operations of the Maintenance and
Utilities Shops.
* Operate and maintain steam boiler plant.
* Maintain grounds and irrigation systems not covered under Facilities Support
Contracts.
* Perform pest control function in buildings and grounds.
* Prepare and process material requisitions for minor and specific work.
Exhibit 1-2 (Page 1 of 4)
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3. ENGINEERING DIVISION
* Provide technical support for maintenance and repair of facilities.
* Conduct engineering studies and prepare reports with respect to public works,
public utilities, and environmental protection.
* Implement and administer the Shore Installation and Facilities Planning and
Programming System at the activity level.
* Provide continuous technical assistance for the operation, maintenance,
utilization, and conservation of utilities.








































































HIGH 2 3 4 6
ROUTINE 3 5 7 8
N
C
E LOW 6 7 9 10
SAFETY Work identified primarily for safety reasons.
FUNCTIONAL Work primarily identified with the activity's mission.
APPEARANCE Work primarily for preserving or upgrading the appearance of a facility.
Each of these work classifications will have three levels of importance. The importance level of
an individual job is based on its impact in relation to other jobs in the same classification.
HIGH The high level indicates that the urgency of work accomplishment is
significantly greater than routine.
ROUTINE The routine level designates the normal degree of urgency for the
contemplated work to be accomplished. Most work necessarily will fall into
this category.
LOW The low level indicates that the degree of urgency in the accomplishment of
the requested work is lower than normal.
PRIORITY 1 Priority 1 is reserved for use with specific approval of the Public Works
Officer or Assistant PWO. This priority is an overriding emergency, or
urgent priority, that will insert final estimated work into the schedule in any
week by date specified—even as soon as the next week.
In general, jobs with the highest priority (lowest number) will precede others of lower priority
on the schedule.






























































ACRES - 23,606 acres owned (141 acres avigation easements)
BUILDINGS - 506
ROADS - 175 miles
IMPROVED LAND - 374 acres
UTILITY LINES - 302 miles
CPV (CURRENT PLANT VALUE OF ALL IMPROVEMENTS) - $593,038,535
PW ESTIMATED REPLACEMENT VALUE:
LAND $5.2 billion ($125,000/acre)
IMPROVEMENTS $2.1 billion
TOTAL $7.3 billion








266 Enlisted 2 & 4 unit bldgs
9 Public Quarters
(Built 1950's)
9 Enlisted 3 & 6 unit bldgs
108 Mobile Home Spaces
(Built 1971)
REAL ESTATE
CLASS I REAL ESTATE - 23,228 acres +/-
PROPOSED ACQUISITIONS - Exchange 406 acres +/-
PROPOSED DISPOSALS - 195 acres +/-
8 LEASES (CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS AND/OR RENT)
26 LICENSES (TEMPORARY USE)
EASEMENTS - 11 Avigation (417 acres); 69 other
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LESSON II: OMB CIRCULAR A-76
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1800' s, Congress attempted to restrict size of the
Federal Government by regulating numbers of civilian and military
employees. These size restraints caused Federal Agencies to
contract out for goods and services. Various attempts and
recommendations were made to terminate commercial functions
performed by Government employees over the years. However, not
until 1966 was the first solid Federal policy move towards
privatization enacted, when the Bureau of the Budget issued
Circular A-7 6. This set the foundation for today's commercial
activities program.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 program
prescribes the policies and procedures for use by all executive
branch agencies in determining whether products and services used
by the government should be obtained from private contractors or
performed "in-house." The circular reflects the commitment to
reduce the cost of Government and to avoid unwarranted Governmental-
intrusion into the private sector.
A-76 emphasizes three policies to be followed by the United
States Government. They are:
1) Achieve economy and enhance production through competition.
Whenever possible, the private sector will be allowed to
compete against the government in providing goods and services
needed by the government.
2) Retain Government functions in-house. This refers to such
activities as National defense, and other functions that are
not in competition with the commercial sector, and shall be
performed by Federal employees.
3) Rely on commercial sector. This policy states that the
government will rely on the commercial sector and not start or
carry out any activity that is available through commercial
contracts.
Overall, the main theme of Circular A-76 is to commercialize all
government activities that can be performed by the civilian
community.
There are a limited number of conditions under which the
Federal government is authorized to operate a commercial or
industrial activity. They include:
* Reprinted with permission from Practical Comptrillership, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
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(1) NO SATISFACTORY COMMERCIAL SOURCE IS AVAILABLE . Either no
commercial source is capable of providing product or service or use
of a commercial source would cause an unacceptable delay or
disruption of an essential program.
(2) WHEN NATIONAL DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS TAKE PRECEDENCE . The
activity is subject to combat conditions, is essential for training
in exclusively military skills or the work is required to provide
appropriate work assignment for career progression or rotation
purposes.
(3) When commercial sources would result in a higher cost to
the government.
In order to prove lower cost, government entities are required
to conduct cost comparisons and/or review of all in-house
activities that have any potential for being performed by a
commercial activity.
OMB A-76 has established steps that must be followed whenever
a function is being considered for contracting out. Each Federal
agency will normally coordinate and monitor commercial activity
milestones in accordance with OMB A-76 by placing a designated
department in charge of the program. For example, the Chief of
Naval Operations (OPNAV 43) coordinates and monitors Navy
commercial activity programs. OPNAV 4 3 will task Navy activities
to review certain functions as potential commercial activity
candidates, establish reporting milestones, task activities to
perform an internal review, maintain a CA inventory, and monitor
progress leading to a competition between the government and
private sector.
Those activities nominated will do an in-depth review of its
current organization and staffing and ultimately establish a Most
Efficient Organization (MEO) . The MEO is a streamlined
organization that can still perform its intended mission, however,
it is also the basis for defining the cost to the government of
performing that function. Finally, a Statement of Work (SOW) is
prepared to describe the details of how the function is performed
and becomes the basis for competition with the private sector.
The MEO is turned over to the contracting activity in the form
of a sealed bid. The SOW is used to solicit proposals from the
commercial sector. It describe the minimum need of the government
and is key to the source selecting process. The SOW is also the
key to good performance if the function is awarded to a contractor.
The government's estimate to perform the function (based on the
MEO) and contractor proposals are compared and a winner is
selected. However, contractor proposals must be at least 10
percent lower than the government's proposal to be awarded a
contract.
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In the simplest of terms, the Commercial Activities program
requires all Federal agencies (including the Department of Defense)
to procure new commercial goods and services from the private
sector, to identify all commercial activities, to conduct cost
comparisons between existing government operated commercial
activities and interested bidders, and to select the most
economical means for obtaining commercial products and services.
B. IMPLEMENTATION
The three areas of Government services that are considered for
A-76 implementation are: existing activities, expansions of those
activities, and new requirements. The process for conversion of
existing activities and new requirements consist of four phases:
inventory, management review, cost comparison, and implementation
of the results of the cost comparison.
1. Existing Services
To determine if an existing service can or should be
commercialized the four phases are broken into 13 steps. The 13
steps are displayed in Figure 1.
If an activity is determined to be a Government function it
is retained and the review is complete (step 1) . If not, the
function must begin the inventory phase and is placed on a schedule
for review at least once every five years to determine if it can be
commercialized (steps 2 and 3) . An inventory of Government
commercial activities involves separating the activities into two
groups - those functions with ten or less full-time equivalent
(FTE) work years and those with more than ten FTEs.
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The management review phase of program implementation involves
systematic examination and analysis by the activity to identify any
circumstances that would preclude performance of the function by a
commercial source (steps 4, 5, and 6). Step 7 states that if an
unacceptable delay were to occur, the activity should remain in-
house. Step 8 is consideration for the Preferential Procurement
Program (PPP) . The PPP is an agreement such that no comparison
between Government and commercial costs need be made, and that
contracts are issued under the procuring agency. Federal Prison
Industries, handicapped industries and other small and minority
businesses are some examples.
Step 9 involves the review of the FTEs established in Step 2.
Activities with less than 10 FTEs should be considered for
conversion to contract if costs are reasonable (Step 11) . Step 10
provides the Assistant Secretary level the option to waive a cost
comparison and convert the activity to a commercial contract
regardless of any cost increases.
For those functions that can be performed commercially, the
third and most complex phase of program implementation begins in
the cost comparison (Step 12). The cost study itself consists of
several different steps beginning with the development of the
Performance Work Statement (PWS) . The task analysis involved in
the development of the PWS must identify and quantify the output
generated by the function. The PWS forms the basis of both the
government's and commercial sources' cost estimation/bids and
therefore must accurately reflect what is desired in terms of
quality and performance.
The next step of the A-76 process is to conduct a management
study/review with respect to the stated tasks of the PWS. Once
this review has been conducted, the organization is restructured
into what is termed as the Most Efficient Organization or MEO.
Concurrent with the development of the MEO is the preparation
of the in-house cost estimate. Guidance for the preparation of
this estimate is contained in the Cost Comparison Handbook. The
government's bid for providing the product or service is compared
to that of the lowest, competent private bidder and a decision is
made to either retain the function in-house or to contract it out.
Step 13 is to award the contract to the commercial sector if
contract costs are less than in-house personnel costs by 10 percent
or more, of if not to continue Government performance of the
activity.
2 . New Services
The decision tree for awarding a contract for a new
requirement has only eight steps and is displayed in Figure 2.
Step one is unchanged, if the activity is a governmental function
it remains, if not continue on. Steps two and three determine
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whether the activity is National Defense, and patient care, these
activities are retained in-house. Step four determines if a
satisfactory commercial source is available, if not, the activity
will remain in-house. If the contract is to be awarded under PPP,
the process ends and the contract is let. If not, then it must be
determined if competitive contract costs would be reasonable. If
a contract is awarded then the process ends with step six. Should
it be determined that it is not reasonable to award a competitive
contract without a cost comparison, then one would be conducted
(Step seven) . Upon completion of the cost comparison, a contract
is awarded if the following criteria are met: total contract costs
are less than total in-house estimates by ten percent of personnel
costs and twenty-five percent of acquisition costs of equipment and
plant necessary to perform the service.
Throughout the two A-76 processes there are numerous exceptions
and shortcuts available to eliminate the requirements to convert to
commercial contract and/or conduct lengthy, time consuming cost
comparison studies. These exist to simplify the mechanics involved
in transitioning from Government to commercially run activities.
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C. REALITY
Since its inception, A-76 has evolved into a controversial
instrument. Its proponents claim that it reduces costs, while its
opponents argue that it lowers the quality of work performed. In
reality, competition for contracts have generated over one billion
dollars in savings annually. Since 1979, over 1,700 A-76 cost
studies have been conducted with the resultant savings averaging
over 20% of previous costs. More recent studies have indicated
that even greater savings can be achieved. Potential future
savings have been estimated to approach ten billion dollars
annually.
Despite these enormous savings, criticism of the A-76
Commercial Activities persist. Some of the criticisms of the A-76
program have included the following (each of them disputed by the
Office of Management and Budget)
:
(1) Loss of managerial flexibility. Almost every major
business buys some form of goods or services from other businesses.
The Federal government is no different. They all do it because it
is an economical means to get specialized goods and services at a
competitive price.
(2) Contractor strikes will paralyze Federal operations. The
0MB has documented only two strikes by contractor employees since
the inception of the program. Both of these strikes were handled
successfully by existing contingency plans. A-76 holds the
contractor financially/legally liable for employee strikes. Every
A-76 contract is required to have a strike contingency plan.
(3) Loss of jobs by government employees. Experience within
the Department of Defense (which has the most experience in A-76
contracts) doesn't bear out this criticism. When an activity does
contract out, all government employees have the right of first
refusal to any employment opening with the contractor.
(4) Unscrupulous contractors buy-in to A-7 6 contracts and then
raise their prices. The majority of A-76 contracts are firm, fixed
price contracts with pre-priced options which allow only Department
of Labor authorized wage increases. The government always retains
the prerogative of resuming in-house operations when it becomes
more economical to do so.
(5) A-76 is a contracting out program. The objective of the
program is to improve government management and productivity
through fair competition. A-76 is a program which provides the
incentive to reexamine and improve Federal operations in order to
be cost competitive with the free market system. Where it has been
demonstrated that it is more cost effective to retain work in-
house, commercial activities remain within that organization.
Studies have shown about 45% of commercial activities are retained
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in-house after manager.; >nt completes their efficienct reviews. The
other 55% of commercial activities contract out. In either case,
the decision is based on economy and efficiency and the government
has been able to consistently reduce its costs.
(6) A-7 6 commercial activities create too much paperwork. For
some people any paperwork is too much. The cost savings garnered
by the paperwork required for A-76 studies and contracts have beer.
deemed by the Office of Management and Budget to far outweigh the
cost of doing the paperwork.
The paperwork required to comply with Circular A-76 is clearly
outlined in the supplement to the circular. The supplement is
divided into four parts which clearly outline all requirements for
A-76 compliance. The supplement discusses policy implementation,
writing and administering performance work statements, management
study guide and the cost comparison handbook.
D. A-76 MANAGEMENT TI 3 S
A positive approach to A-76 related requirements can facilitate
a smoother execution of the program. The following management tips
are provided to assist comptrollers in the implementation of the A-
76 program at their activities.
1 . Planning
An A-76 study requires extensive up-front planning and
preparation to define requirements, establish objectives, discuss
options for achie%'ing those objectives, identify potential problems
and solutions, and develop specific procedures for conducting the
study. This step lays the ground work for following steps, making
it essential for effective executions.
2 . Ccrrur.icaticr.
Mistrust, misinformation, low morale, and anger can be
reduced by thoroughly communicating the A-76 program to all
employees. This corn :r.:cation will not eliminate the negative
feelings Government employees have about the A-76 program, but it
will mitigate such pro'cle-s. The enployee must understand that the
A-76 program is a Government policy that federal managers are
required to implement. Ccrrunication should include the following:
Prestudy orientation meeting including a question-
er, d -answer session.





"Easy Access" to staff and management for questions
and counseling.
Postreview briefing of results and impacts, including





The caliber and commitment of the personnel assigned to
implement the A-76 study will determine the degree to which
objectives are achieved. Participation in an A-76 study should
include top management and the establishment of a committee to
coordinate and control the overall A-76 program within the
organization. This committee should be chaired by a high-level
manager and membership should include a senior manager from the
affected activity, a union representative, a personnel office
supervisor, a senior attorney, and a procurement manager.
In addition to coordinating and controlling the A-67
program, this committee will decide who will conduct the study. It
is recommended that the study group include: a contract
specialist, a cost and pricing analyst, a personnel specialist, a
legal supervisor, and a functional expert.
4 Documentation
The documentation must justify management's decision to
contract out or retain the function in-house. Not only is the
justification important for presenting to top management and union
representatives, but the Government Accounting Office (GAO)
routinely audits A-76 reviews. If the documentation is
insufficient, the agency is subject to GAO and Congressional
criticism. In this regard it is wise to prepare a comprehensive
decision paper that identifies the purpose and objectives of the
study, the options available, evaluation criteria, a description of
the process used and its results, conclusions, and recommendations.
5 Implementation
The implementation step is work extensive and requires a
significant effort by the study group, but if the first four steps
were done correctly, this step should go smoothly. The plans
developed for communication, participation, and documentation are
carried out throughout this lengthy and most critical stage.
The personnel office plays a key role during the
implementation step. If the decision is to contract out the
function, the sensitive area of personnel management must be
properly handled to prevent an adverse impact on morale and
productivity.
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6 . Follow-up
An effective follow-up program is important for two
reasons depending on whether the function is contracted out or
retained in-house. First, follow-up is required to ensure
continued improvement of federally performed commercial activities.
Second, to ensure that those activities that are contracted out
consistently measure up to established standards. The follow-up
should be accomplished through identification, discussion, and
documentation of "lessons learned;" comparison of actual versus
projected results; and periodic evaluation of the quality and cost
of the "most efficient" federal or contractor operation.
The six steps discussed here represent nothing new.
These same steps are required for the management of any large,
detailed program. The above discussion does provide some of the
details required to properly accomplish each step. Since the A-76
program is here to stay, the above six steps should be used as a
guide in conducting both large and small A-76 reviews.
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'ODE POSITIOH 4ND GRADE COST
182 Supv logistics Enfr OS-flOI-12 140,601
Industrial En£ Tech. GS-895-9 128,001
Facilities Malnt. Clerk OS 303 4 116,517
Clerk-Typist GS-322-04 116.517
Clerk-Typist GS-322-3 114,714
PiE (Elec.) KD-2805-8 135,041
PiE (Pipe.) W-4204-8 135.041
ru (General) WD-«701-08 135,041
Electrical Inspector KG-2805-11 128,759
Pipefitter Inspector W-4204-11 128,759
P.W. Maintenance Inspector IU 4701-11 128,759
SUBTOTAL 1307,750
H85 P.*. General Foreaan WS-4701-15
Clerk-Typist OS-322-04
Production Controller OS- 1152-09
Production Controller GS- 1 152-09




Air Cond Equip. Foreaan WS-5306-10
DtlL.Sys.. Repair Opejv JO-4742-11









Electrician (BY) m 2810 10







A/C Equip. Mech. «G-5306-8/10
A/C Equip. Mech. WO-5306 8/10
A/C Equip. Mech. #3-5306-8/10




















































feint. Mech. WG 4749-9 126.108
Tool En. Mech. WG-4801-8/9 •26, 108
Electrical Worker WG-2805-5/8 125,315
Electrical Worker WO-2805-5/8 125,315
Electrical Worker WO-2805-5/8 125,315
feint. Worker WG-4749-7/8 125,315
feint Worker WO-4749-7/8 125,315
feint Worker WO-4749-7/8 125,315
feint Worker WO-4749-7/8 125.315
feint Worker WG-4749-7/8 125.315
feint Worker WO-4749-7/8 •25,315
feint Worker WO-4749-7/8 #25,315
feint Worker WO-4749-7/8 125,315
feint Worker WO-4749-7/8 125.315
Pest Controller WO-5026-5/7/9 (26.108
Pest Controller WQ-5026-5/7/9 126.108
Pest Controller WO-5026-5/7/9 126,108
i/C Equip, tech VO-5306-5/8 125,315
A/C Equip. Mech WO-5306-5/8 125,315
A/C Equip. Hecb WG-5306-5/8 125,315
A/C Equip, lech WO-5306-5/8 125,315
Equip. Repairer WQ-5352-5/8 125,315
Equip. Bepairer WO-5352-5/8 #25,315
Powered Suppt. Sys. Jpr. WQ-5378-B 125,315
Swin. Pool Opr. WQ-5486-8 125,315
Sign Painter WQ-4104-7 124,439
Port. Equip. Opr. WQ-5478-6 123,562










Uborer WQ-3502-2 (.626) •11,510
Pluaber Worker WQ-4206-7 •24.439
feint. Worker WO-4749-5/7 •24,439
feint. Worker WQ-4749-5/7 •24,439
feint. Worker WO-4749-5/7 •24,439
feint. Worker WQ-4749-5/7 •24,439
Equip. Rpr/Mecb WQ-5352-8/10 •26,901
Plunber Wkr WQ-4206-7 •24,439
Plusher Wkr WQ-4206-7 •24,439
SUBTOTAL •2,213,997
Trajts. General Forewn WS-4701-14 •42,178
luto. Trans. Spec. GS-2 150-7/9 •28,001
Production Controller OS- 1 152-7 •22,887
Coiputer Operator GS-322-5 •18,481
Acctng Tech. GS-525-4 •16,517
Auto. Equip. Dispatcher 03-2151-4 •16,517
Clerk GS-303-3 •14,714
Trans. Equip. Opr. Foreman WS-5701-10 •26,901
Autotwtive Mech. Foreman WS-5823-IO •26,901
Engln. Equip. Oper. Leader WL-5716-10 •26,901
AutoBotlv ( Mech. Leader WL-5823-10 •28,508
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MVO Leader WL-5803-8 126,707
MVO Leader (IISTB) WL-5803-7 126,839
Auto Sepalr Imp WO-5823-11 127,757
Mobile Equip. Metal Mech VG-3B09-10 126,901
Bigger WQ-5210-10 126,901
Enjr. Equip. Opr. VG-5716-10 126,901
Engr. Equip. Opr. VO-5716-10 126,901
Engr. Equip. Opr. VO-5716-10 126,901
Heavy Mobile Equip. Mech. WO-5803-8/10 126,901
Heavy Mobile Equip. Mech. VQ-5803-8/10 126,901
Heavy Mobile Equip. Mech. VO-5803-8/10 126,901
luto Mechanic VQ-5823-8/10 126,901
Auto Mechanic VO-5823-8/10 126,901
Auto Mechanic VQ-5823-8/10 126,901
Auto Mechanic VQ-5823-8/10 126,901
Auto Mechanic 10-5823-8/10 126,901
Auto Mechanic MG-5823-8/10 126,901
MVO MO- 5703-8 125,315
MVO WQ-5703-8 125,315
MVO MO-5703-8 125,315
Auto Worker VO-5823-5/8 125,315




Airfield Clear Equip Opr VO 5767-7 124,439
Airfield Clear Equip Opr VO 5767-7 124,439
Airfield Clear Equip Opr VO 5767-7 124,439
Airfield Clear Equip Opr VO 5767-7 124,439
Airfield Clear Equip Opr VO 5767-7 124,439
Tire fipr. Heavy VO-4504-6 123,562
MVO VO-5703-6 123,562
Tool A Parts Attnd VO-6904-5/6 123,562
MVO VO-5703-5 122,748
Mobile Equip Serv VO-5806-3 119,910
1187
SUBTOTAL 11,161
Hazardous Waste Handler VO-6501-7 124












To: All Public Works Customers
Subj: PUBLIC WORKS CUSTOMER SERVICE SURVEY
1. In an effort to better serve our customers the Public Works
Department is conducting a survey among our customers. LTJG Scants,
on TAD assignment, is visitng various Kensington departments and tenant
activities to ask how we can improve our service.
2. Your cooperation in this survey is greatly appreciated. Point of
contacts are: LTJG Scant" at 7-6397 or LCDR Patrick at 7-1084.
CUM. .
A. W. ALEXANDER
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1. ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE RESPONSE TIME IT
TAKES PUBLIC WORKS TO COMPLETE A WORK REQUEST 12 3 4 5
2. ARE EMERGENCY SERVICE (E.S.) CALLS TAKEN CARE
OF PROMPTLY V 12 3 4 5
3. IS THE RECEPTION BRANCH OF E.S. COURTEOUS AND
HELPFUL WHEN PLACING A CALL 12 3 4 5
4. ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE QUALITY OF WORK
WHEN E.S. MAKES A REPAIR 12 3 4 5
5. HAVE YOU EVER SUBMITTED A WORK REQUEST FOR
NON-EMERGENCY SERVICES AND IF YES, DO YOU
FIND IT DIFFICULT FILLING OUT A WORK REQUEST 12 3 4 5
6. DOES PUBLIC WORKS EVER NOTIFY YOU ON THE
STAT IS OF YOUR WORK REQUEST 12 3 4 5
7. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH NAS MIRAMAR INST.
11014.1H WHICH OUTLINES THE PROPER
PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING PUBLIC WORK
SERVICES 12 3 4 5
8. HAVE YOU TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE SELF-HELP
PROGRAM 12 3 4 5
IF YES, HOW WOULD YOU RATE RESPONSE TIME
TO GET SUPPLIES OR ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO
COMPLETE SELF-HELP PROJECTS 12 3 4 5
10. HAVE YOU EVER HAD DIFFICULTY RECEIVING A
VEHICLE FROM TRANSPORTATION 12 3 4 5
11. ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE QUALITY AND
TIMELINESS OF VEHICLE REPAIRS 12 3 4 5
12. ARE YOU AWARE THAT NAS MIRAMAR HAS A
HAZARDOUS WASTE TRAINING PROGRAM 12 3 4 5
13. HAS IT BEEN BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION
THE PROCEDURES FOR PROPER HANDLING AND
DISPOSING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE MATERIALS
SUGGESTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, L COMPLAINTS.







SUBJECT; PUBLIC WORKS CUSTOMER SERVICE SURVEY
PURPOSE: Summarize Public Works Irack record in the Maintenance. Repair, Sell-Help.
Transportation, and Hazardous Waste Departments so that planning in the future
can be Total Quality Management enhanced
BACKGROUND A survey was provided to NAS fHH cuslompis 13 qijestjons were asked
dealing specifically with matters important for Public Works to better under-
stand where improvements con be made Each survey was personally given to
the customer. After the survey was filled out the customer was asked to elab-
orate on each specific question The customer was than asked to voice any
suggestions, recommendations, or complaints
^fnbst
DISCUSSION: The responses to the survey varied from question to question. Response time to
emergen cy service jcajjs_jjnd the quality of E.S. repairs were onthe whole marked
3etter~tFian averagej^Being notified on the status of work requests was the sjngjej^
lost major complaint__ajid_ marked overwhelmingly unfavorable in the survey//
"Mat/or complaints were lack of information when calling to find out on the status
of a particular work request and length of time responding to work requests
Many customers also complained about the Trouble Desk losjng or not sending
back work requests to the right person CTfTe Transportation DepTTfared much
better with only the ('Weapons D^pI^ancTlvTMD) voi cing complaint*; nbgirt | ajjf_ of
forklilts for their operations Responses for the Sell-Help and Hazardous Wasle
Dept. were overwhelmingly favorable.
CONCLUSION: Look at the attached survey with ihe overall percentages for each question.
lECOMMEND:/Wrth hard hit areas such as lack of status for work request orders, the customer
I
was not so angry because work requests weren't being done, but because they
^were const antly left in the dark as to when the job might be approached/ The
The typecustomer would appreciate more feed-back from the Trouble Desk
of feed-back the customer wants is more detailed information about their
work requests and a approximate date as to when the job might be accomplished.
This would keep the customer from resubmitting work request orders because
they would know tor certain that a job order won*t be approached for awhile.
The main problem now is that the Trouble Desk for lack of notifying the
customer, i eaveFlFF" "customer in th~e dark_»nH makp<; him fp ej forgotten
Alleviate this problem and you will alleviate the problem of the customer
constantly resubmitting work requests that are already in the system. The
Trouble Desk needs to slart a more hands on approach to helping the customer,
and needs to get away from always making the customer call first to find out
the status. A start would be for the Trouble Desk to send the Work Request
Status Reports weekly rather than bi-monthly which is now the current policy.





1 2 3 4 5
1 ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE RESPONSE TIME
IT TAKES P.W.S TO COMPLETE A WORK REOUEST
2 ARE EMERGENCY SERVICE CALLS TAKEN CARE
OF PROMPTLY
3. IS THE RECEPTION BRANCH OF E S COURTEOUS
AND HELPFUL WHEN PLACING A CALL
4. ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE OUALITY OF WORK q%7<
WHEN E.S. MAKES A REPAIR
5. HAVE YOU EVER SUBMITTED A WORK REOUEST
FOR NON-EMERGENCY SERVICES AND IF YES.
DO YOU FIND IT DIFFICULT FILLING IT OUT
6 DOES PUBLIC WORKS EVER NOTIFY YOU ON
THE STATUS OF YOUR WORK REOUEST
7. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH NAS MIRAMAR INST.
11014.1H WHICH OUTLINES THE PROPER
PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING P.W. SERVICES
8 HAVE YOU TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE SELF-HELP
PROGRAM
9. IF YES. HOW WOULD YOU RATE RESPONSE TIME
TO GET SUPPLIES OR ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO
COMPLETE SELF-HELP PROJECTS
10. HAVE YOU EVER HAD DIFFICULTY RECEIVING A
VEHICLE FROM TRANSPORTATION
11. ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE OUALITY AND
TIMELINESS OF VEHICLE REPAIRS
12. ARE YOU AWARE THAT NAS MIRAMAR HAS A
HAZARDOUS WASTE TRAINING PROGRAM
13. HAS IT BEEN BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION THE
PROCEDURES FOR PROPER HANDLING AND DIS-
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DETAILED FINDINGS
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PWD OPERATIONS
1. Assignment of limited quantities of work to craftsman; in some cases,
service chits are issued one at a time to the worker.
2. Lack of material/parts for PMI tasks.
3. Not using safety equipment: ear plugs, safety belts on hi-lift equipment and
lack of safety/cargo nets to keep material from falling off vehicles.
4. Performance indices have not been developed to cover the effectiveness of
scheduling, labor hour distribution, shop productivity, material support effectiveness,
P&E productivity, and the effectiveness of the control inspection program.
5. Material support provided by the Supply Dept. is inadequate and hinders the
performance of maintenance work. Adequate inventory control is not maintained at
the primary operational warehouse. Public Works has not provided input on items to
stock or frequency of use.
6. The Engineering Division's response time to work requests is excessive; 24
percent of the work requests are about one year old, 18 percent are two years old, and
4.5 percent are six years old.
7. Inadequate communication/scheduling/work input control:
* going to perform job which has been completed/cancelled
* customer not notified in advance
* job started without material
* going to job site and finding out that previous phases have not been
completed by other shops
8. Inadequate job package/descriptions:
* lack specific job site location
* PMI's without checklist or list of buildings
9. Insufficient training on specialized equipment.
10. Insufficient/inadequate preliminary job planning by craftsman (when
detailed job description was included in package):
* bringing wrong tools/materials
* forgetting tools/materials
* starting job without reading description/diagram and having to rework
11. Non-availability of foreman when craftsman returns to shop for new
assignment.
Ehibit 1-8 (Page 1 of 2)
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12. Use of craftman on a one man job
* poor job assignment practices
* lack of work to assign
13. Poor work procedures:
* manually turning sprinkler system on and off , thereby causing excess
travel and wasted time
* operational checks of equipment (not PMI)
14. Craftsman performing work without chits or work requests
15. Equipment deficiencies
* pest control personnel have to spend excess time filling up tanks
because of small diameter hoses
* defective equipment (hydrometer, battery load tester)
* older, maintenance prone equipment (triplex mowers)
16. Stopping work before the end of the shift
* driving around
* idleness
* excessive cleaning/putting away of tools and equipment
17. Aging work force—majority retired military
* excessive sick leave
18. Large number of high visibility, command interest jobs
* Vice President Quayle's visits
* annual air show
* 600 barrels-painted yellow




























NOTE: THIS IS TOTAL OF BOTH STATION AND PROJECT COSTS
Exhibit 1-9
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C. CASE STUDY TWO—READY. . .SET. . .GO!
1. And the Winner is...
Based on his findings and his study of strategic
management in private business (in particular Tom Peters book
Thriving On Chaos ) , CDR Alexander decided to revamp the MEO
and corresponding cost estimate. His recommendations included
a decentralized, product/market organization (better customer
service) and a reduction in grade (reclassification) for a
number of workers (cost savings) . A comparison of the two
MEOs is found in Exhibit 2-1. He was now confident that PWD
Kensington would be victor in the CA (OMB Circular A-76)
study.
Indeed he was right. On August 3rd a message was
received from the CNO authorizing continued in-house
maintenance and repair of station facilities through the
implementation of the MEO.
2. Basis for Decisions
"LCDR Kirkland, welcome, it is good to have you on
board." CDR Alexander greeted his new APWO. "I realize you
have just arrived, but I would like you to get up to speed on
things as guickly as possible. Plan to block out tomorrow
morning to discuss the organization and our soon to be
implemented MEO. This afternoon go ahead and begin to get
settled in."
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"LCDR Patrick should have left you a MEO pass-down
file with a number of items in it," explained CDR Alexander.
"Be sure it has the CNO decision to implement the MEO (Exhibit
2-2) , a breakdown of the MEO—billets and organization charts
(Exhibit 2-3) , and a transition plan (Exhibit 2-4) . If any of
those items are missing see Nancy (my secretary) for a copy."
"In addition to the information you have in the pass-
down file, I would also like you to know and understand where
I am coming from and the basis for many of my decisions," the
Commander continued.
A RIF will be one of the first actions taken to
implement the MEO. Since Public Works' mission is highly
labor intensive, a logical step to reduce costs and streamline
the organization is to downgrade and/or eliminate positions.
CDR Alexander, though, did not want any of his current
employees to have to "walk out the door." Therefore, in order
to keep everyone employed, the RIF will entail only a
reduction in grade for a number of workers, but no actual loss
of jobs.
In addition to the reduction in grade as a measure to
safeguard positions, no new hires will be considered until
after the RIF. Because a RIF is based on civil service
seniority a new hire could potentially come in with more years
of service or higher veterans points and bump out one of the
current workers.
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The division most affected by the RIF will be
Maintenance and Utilities. They are extremely "top heavy"—so
much so, that it is not unusual that a journeyman electrician
is being sent out to (and subsequently being paid) to chance
light bulbs or a journeyman plumber to replace a washer in a
faucet. Both tasks could, and should, be done by a less
expensive/ less skilled laborer or maintenance worker.
It is also necessary to reduce the grade of some of
the positions in order to prepare for the future. In years to
come fewer journeymen will be available for hire as a result
of our country shifting from an industrial age to a service
oriented age of work. This is evidenced by the increasing
numbers of young people today who are choosing service type
trades (computer analysis, electronic specialists, and the
like) and white collar work over blue collar (trade) work.
The other major aspect of the MEO is the restructuring
of the organization; again this affects the Maintenance and
Utilities Division most significantly. The restructure
involves changing from a centralized, functional organization
(i.e., shops grouped by trades) to a more decentralized,
product/market organization (i.e., shops grouped into
geographical teams—regional companies) . Organization charts
are part of Exhibit 2-3.
The shops will be reorganized into two "regional
companies" (i.e., project teams— "Team 1" is responsible for
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the north half of the station, and "Team 2" is responsible for
the south half of the station) and an emergency services
company (E/S is responsible for all emergency and service
calls on the station) . Each company will be comprised of
workers from the various trades, however, because of the
position downgrades not every trade will be represented on
each team. The maintenance workers will need to take up the
slack. This should encourage cross utilization of trades,
expedite work request completion, and give the team foremen
more control over the scheduling of jobs.
Under the current system a multi-trade work request
such as the installation of an electrical junction box would
require the supervisors of three of four different shops to
coordinate the scheduling of their respective workers—
a
carpenter to cut a hole in the dry wall for the box, a laborer
to pull the wires and to tack weld the box, an electrician to
connect the wires, another carpenter to patch the wall after
installation of the box, and finally a painter to paint the
box and the patched portion of the wall. This process could,
and frequently does, take many weeks to complete such simple
tasks. If a carpenter is not available the electrician is not
able to perform his portion of the task and must wait. Or, if
the carpenter, electrician, and laborer complete their
portions of the task but a painter is not available, the
completion of the job is once again held up. In either case
the customer is not receiving the timely service he is due.
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By having all of the necessary trades in one team, the
team foreman has better control over the scheduling and
coordination of work in his area, and by taking advantage of
cross trade utilization he would actually only have to send
out one or possible two workers to complete such a task.
"Well that should give you a pretty good idea of where
I am coming from," stated CDR Alexander as he wrapped up his
conversation with LCDR Kirkland. "For a more thorough
understanding, I suggest you pick up a copy of Tom Peters'
book Thriving On Chaos . If you have any guestions don't
hesitate to come in and see me."
3. Preparing the Way
Throughout the next several months the Commander held
monthly meeting with his division directors, with his shop
foreman, and with the individual work groups. Discussions at
these meetings focused on what was happening and when it would
be happening.
4. The Ax Falls
On 27 January 1991 PWD Kensington finally underwent
their long expected RIF. Numerous personnel were "demoted"
(reduced in grade) but no one was put out of work. The RIF
was the first step in the implementation of the MEO. Public




"Margaret," (Margaret Shaston is the PWD
Administration Officer) would you please come into my office?"
inquired CDR Alexander.
"As you know, Margaret, I will be transferring the
middle of September and CDR Knight will be taking over the
department. Prior to our turnover, I would like you to put
together a package detailing the current status of the
department and the workings of the "new" organizational
structure. I am particularly interested in everyone's
thoughts on the team concept and how well they think it is
working.
"
Margaret, not being in the workers' or other division
directors' chain of command, was able to obtain candid and
forthright comments. The package she turned over to the
Commander was a compilation of those comments.
a. APWO comments
• The RIF caused us to put "square pegs in round holes."
For example, our most knowledgeable painter was busted
back to a maintenance mechanic
—
painter's helper while a
less qualified, but more senior, worker was made a
journeyman painter.
• The team concept is not working too well because the
workers are not trained in the other trades. Blue collar
training is difficult to find and extremely expensive.
• We have an older work force who are very set in their
ways. Some of the guys have been working here for 10 to
20 years. They are resistant to any type of change.
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• There is a morale problem. Many of the more qualified
workers were busted a grade of two; they do not have the
responsibility they used to. A common attitude is—"Joe's
the 'expert' and he's not working all too hard so why
should I. I'll just sit back and coast awhile too."
• We took too big of a step and have pushed the workers
outside of their comfort zone. They do not feel qualified
to work outside their area of "expertise."
• Prior to the MEO we had no shop load plan or any type of
maintenance plan. The squeaky wheel got the grease. Now
we have a scheduler on board, a monthly shop load plan is
being adhered to, and a base wide maintenance plan is in
the works.
• A lot of bad habits were developed during the seven years
of the CA study. We must fix those let alone worry about
the MEO.
• We are responding to the customer better. COMFIT, our
largest customer, has expressed satisfaction with the new
set up. The customer gets to know the people working on
their building (s) and he knows who is in charge.
• Management has very little idea of what is going on at the
worker level. There are very few tools available. We are
working on developing some to track productivity and
efficiency.
• Everything interdepartmental has been by work of mouth.
We have no written explanation or guidance concerning the
MEO.
• The vision has not been understood by everyone. The
division directors and foremen do not understand why we
did what we did. If they don't get it, why should we
expect the workers to.
Jb. Division Director
• We can now perform work more intelligently. That is, if
a chit requires multiple trades we can now do the work
concurrently instead of in series.
• We still seem to have quite a bit of back-log work, but a
lot of it is due to the supply system. Public Works does
not receive first consideration—the airplanes are top
priority.
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• The team concept is good. It makes great business sense.
It just needs a little "tweaking." It would help to hire
multi-trade employees but with the hiring freeze on we
can't do that just yet. Right now we have quite a few
"square pegs in round holes."
• Our customers have expressed satisfaction with the new
system. They say their service is better than ever.
• Still have the typical civil service employee attitude—do
the minimum amount of work absolutely necessary to appear
busy. It is not like in private business where the worker
must remain current and productive or he is out the door.
• The MEO is based on standards (i.e., the number of man
hours available each year) . PWD work force is elderly
which means more down time then the standards project.
The current organization does not have enough people to be
able to handle the normal workload and cover for the
excessive worker down time.
c. Division Director
• The MEO was put together with a very sharp pencil. CDR
Alexander evaluated the contingency and put in a fair,
honest bid. It was a catch 22 though. If it had not been
we would have lost to the contractors (cost comparisons -
Exhibits 2-1 and 2-5) , but now since it was we are feeling
the pinch of being understaffed.
• The hiring freeze doesn't help matters either. We
requested a wavier but were denied. So for now we're
stuck with the number of folks we have now.
• We have too many single function people. That is, we only
have one sign maker, one glazer, one locksmith, etc..., if
any one of them is sick or takes leave there is no one to
fill in for them and the work piles up. The same is true
for the high voltage electricians. Granted we have three
of them but they are required by law to work in groups of
two.
• The RIF really hurt us—our best workers were dropped down
to helpers.
• Having one general foreman and three shop foreman works
well.
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• There was no input from the workers or information given
to the workers at the beginning of the process. They feel
betrayed.
d. Division Director
• CDR Alexander changed the MEO significantly, but if he had
not we would have lost. The change was too lean though;
we are cut to the bone. We can't function based on the
standard 1744 hours of production time; it just is not
accurate for an older force.
• We now have more performance rewards. Before only
performance level five was rewarded, now fours get
rewarded too.
• We have the flexibility of alternate work schedules. That
is really nice.
• We have more civilian picnics/holiday parties/admin time
than in the past.
• Spot awards have been implemented—a worker can receive
$100 for exceptional work.
• There is more training than ever before. Unfortunately it
is mostly white collar. Blue collar is difficult to find.
Workers have been offered financial assistance to attend
City College for trades courses but they don't want to do
it on their own time.
• Our work force is elderly—most are retired military. We
have a higher than average use of sick leave. In the past
couple of years alone we have had four or five guys out
for extended periods of time due to heart surgery.
e. Shop Foreman
• In a way we are still under the "old" system because
neither team has the proper distribution of workers in
order to sustain their portion of the station. We are
constantly borrowing or loaning our people back and forth.
• E/S is working great. We have all the trades except a
painter and HVAC. For the most part we don't need them
though; we handle emergency and service calls for jobs
under 16 hours.
• It is only a matter of time—the team concept is a moth
turning into a butterfly.
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f. Shop Foreman
• Jobs are not designed for the team concept.
• We don't have enough people on board to make the system
work—we need more people and have for some time.
• Morale is low. The workers are not happy. They don't
understand why we had to change to regional companies.
• There is a lot of wasted time because materials are not
available.
• We continue to do just breakdown maintenance.
• It is difficult to control people—shops all over the
place
—
people all over the place—supervising is
difficult.
• Work backlogged for lack of material and lack of
tradesman—we need two or three pipefitters.
g. Shop Foreman
• My workers are like ping pong balls. We are constantly
trading workers back and forth. My people are all over
the station. Difficult to supervise.
• There is a great deal of confusion, a lack of continuity
and duplicated efforts.
• People's pride is shot, but not as bad as it used to be.
It will get better when people retire.
• We don't get any feedback from the PWO.
• We are understaffed—hiring freeze and too much sick
leave.
• Quite often my guys are pulled off a job to go do
something else like pull weeds prior to the Vice
President's visits. Too much RHIP (Rank Has Its
Privileges) and not enough common sense.
• Trades are not distributed well.
• The good people are getting worked to death.
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h . Worker
• I don't like the RHIP system. One day during a huge rain
storm I was working on the leaky roof of a room with all
kinds of expensive computers in it and before I was
finished I was yanked off the job and sent over to the
Admiral's house to sand bag his backyard so the water
wouldn't flood it. I think the computers are more
important than the guy's backyard.
• I don't understand how it is we have money for certain
offices to be redecorated but yet we don't have the money
to fix buildings that are literally falling down around
the people who are working in them.
• I really like the idea of cross utilization— it gives me
the opportunity to learn new skills.
i . Worker
• I was a 10 now I'm a 7 (so I don't know anything)
, if they
want it fixed they'll have to tell me how to do it.
• If the standard says this job will take one hour to
complete and it only takes me 15 minutes, I'm going to sit
around for 45 minutes.
• I would like to see us go back to the old "shop" system.
I don't feel comfortable doing other work.
j . Worker
• Morale stinks. We have the wrong people in the wrong
jobs.
• People are working in trades they know nothing about.
Someone is going to get hurt.
• Material needed to do the work is missing. We order the
material we need and then Supply turns down our request.
• Can't find the team leader (foreman) when you need him.
k . Worker
• Busted people are demoralized.
• People are not working together.
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• No one seems to be running anything—everyone just keeps
passing the ball.
1 . Planner and Estimator (P&E)
• Total failure—PWD is at a complete standstill—workers
are completely out of their fields.
• Everything is being done on an emergency basis—wrong
people directing work
—
people who should be making
decisions aren't involved in the process.
• He who screams the loudest and has the biggest friends
gets the work done.
• TQM good if used—must get feedback—not used. No one
gets any feedback from upper management.
m. P&E
• Team concept doesn't work
—
putting plumbers in charge of
electricians destroyed line of succession.
• Lost incentive—no pride—no professionalism—workers
demoralized.
• Not the most efficient organization—don't have qualified
people to do things.
n. P&E
• MEO outline was a good idea but we haven't adhered to it
—
too few people—too large an idea.
• One plumber—one mason—can't have two teams and one
player.
• Highest priority on base is carpet—can get carpet but not
steam leaks fixed—upsetting as an employee and taxpayer
priorities are wrong.
• Military micro-manage—say one thing and do another
happens hourly.
• 750 structures to take care of and everyone thinks theirs
is the most important.
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'0BL1C WORKS DEPARTMENT ffiO COKFAf ISIOKS
ODE
TToTC«<TJ ffiO
P0SIT1OK AJfD GRADE COST CODE
PW KEO
POSITION ADD GRADE COST
167 Sup». Logistics Engr. OS-801-12 140,601
Industrial Eng Tecb. GS-895-9 136,001
Facilities saint Clerk OS-303-4 1)6,517
Clerk-Typist OS-322-04 116,517
Clerk-Typist QS-322-3 f 14,714
ME (Elec.) WD-2805-8 135,041
PIE (Pipe.) WD-4204-8 135,041
PiE (General) WD-4701-08 135,041
Electrical Inspector WO-2805-II 128.759
Pipefitter Inspector •O-4204-ll 128,759
P.M. Maintenance Inspector WO-4701-11 128.759
SUBTOTAL 1307,750
1182 Supv. Eng. Technician GS-802-12 140,601
Industrial Eng Tech. GS-895-9 128,001
Data Transcriber GS-356-2 112,910
Clerk-Typist GS-322-04 116,517
Clerk-Typist GS-322-3 114.714
PiE (Elec.) WD-2805-8 135,041
PIE (Pipe.) WD-4204-8 135,041
PIE (General) WD-4701-08 135,041
Electrical Inspector WG-2805-ll 128,759
Pipefitter Inspector WO-4204-11 (28,759
P.W. Maintenance Inspector WG-4701-11 128,759
SUBTOTAL 1304,143
>185 P.W. General Foresan WS-4701-15 144.265
Clerk-Typist GS-322-04 116,517
Production Controller OS 1152 09 128.001
Production Controller OS- 1 152-09 128,001
Production Controller OS - ] 1 52 -00 128,001
Dtllltles Foresan WS-4701-11 136,169
Maintenance Foresan WS-4707-10 135,041
Electrician Foresan WS-2805-10 135.041





Electrician WO 2805-10 126.901
Electrician WO-2805-10 126.901
Electrician VO-2805-10 126.901
Electrician KG -2805-8/ 10 126.90)
Electrician WO -2805-8/10 126,901
Electrician W0 -2805-8/10 426,901
Electrician •9-2605-8/10 426.901
Electrician (BY) WO 2810 10 126.901
Electrician (BT) WO-28IC-I0 426.901
Machinist •0-3414-10 426,901
Mason WO -3603-10 426,001
Welder WO-3703-8/10 426,901
Welder WO-3703-8/10 426,901
Sheetsetal Mech. WO-3806-8/10 426.901
Pipefitter •0-4204-10 426,901
Pipefitter WO 4204-10 426.901
A/C Equip. Mech. O-5306-8/10 426,901
1/C Equip. Mech. WO 5306-8/10 426.901
A/C Equip. Mech. WO 5306-8/10 426,901
Equip. lepairer/Mech. WO 5352-8/10 126,901
Boiler Mech. WG-5309-10 426,901
Glailer WD 36 1 1 426.108
Lockssith WG-38I7-9 426,108
Dispatcher WO 5701-8 425,315
Painter WO-4102-7/9 426,108
Plusber WO-4208-8 426,108
Plusber W3 4206-9 426,108
Plusber W0 4206 9 426,108
4185
V^
P.W. General Foresan WS-4701-15 444,265
Clerk-Typist OS-322-04 416,517
Production Controller OS- 1 152-09 426.001
Production Controller OS- 1152-09 428,001
Production Controller OS- 1 152-10 430.834
Maintenance Foresan WS -4701-10 435,041
Maintenance Foresan WS-4701-10 435,041
Ma4oWnwee Foresan WS-47O1-J0 435,041
delete <*. M
Elec liars Sys. Mech WO-260I-I0 126,901




Electrician WO 2805 10 126,901
Electrician W3 2805 10 126,901
Electrician WO-2605-10 126.901
Electrician (BV) WO 2810 10 126,901
Electrician (BV) W3 2810 10 126,901
Electrician (BV) WG 2810-10 126,901
Machinist WO 3414 10 126.901
Mason W3 3603- 10 126,901
Welder WO-3703-8/10 126,901
Welder WO-3703-8/10 126,901
Sheetsetal Mecb. WG-3806-8/10 126,901
Pipefitter W0 4204 10 126,901
Pipefitter W0 4204 10 126,901
BVAC Mecb WG 5301-10 126.901
BVAC Mech W0 -5301-10 126,901
BVAC Mecb W3 5301-10 126,901
quip. lepairer/Mecb. WO 5352-8/10 126,901
Boofer WO -3606 10 126,901
Glailer W0 3611 9 126,108
Lockssith WO 3817-9 126,108
Maint. Worker WG-4749-6 125,315
Painter WO 4102-7/9 126.108
Plusber W0 4206-9 126,108
Plusber W0 4206-0 126.108
Plusber WO-4206-9 126,106
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Carpenter WG- 4607-9 126 108
Hunt Hech. WG 4749-9 126 108
Tool Ba Hech. WO-4801-B/9 126 108
Electrical Worker WG-2805-5/8 125 315
Electrical Worker WO-2805-5/8 (25 315
Electrical Worker WO-2805-5/8 125 315
Kaint. Worker W, 4749-7/8 125 315
Halnt. Worker WQ-4749-7/8 125 315
Halnt. Worker n 4740 7/8 (25 315
kUInt Worker WQ-4749-7/8 (25 315
Halnt. Worker WO-4749-7/8 (25 315
Halnt. Worker WQ-4749-7/8 (25 315
Halnt. Worker WQ-4749-7/8 (25 315
Halnt. Worker WQ-4749-7/8 (25 315
Halnt. Worker WQ-4749-7/8 (25 315
Peat Controller WO-5026-5/7/9 (26 108
Peat Controller WO-5026-5/7/9 (26 108
Peat Controller WO-5026-5/7/9 (26 108
A/C Equip. Hech 0-5306-5/8 (25 315
A/C Equip. Hech WQ-5306-5/8 (25 315
A/C Equip. Hech WQ-5306-5/8 (25 315
i/C Equip. Hech WQ-5306-5/8 (25 315
Equip. Bepalrer WQ-5352-5/8 (25 315
Equip. Bepalrer WQ-5352-5/8 (25 315
Powered Suppt. Sys. Bpr. WO -5378 -8 (25 315
Sala. Pool Opr. WO-5486-8 (25 315
Sign Painter WO-4104-7 (24 439
Port. Equip. Opr. WQ-5478-6 (23 562
Painter Helper WQ-4102-5 (22 748
Gardner WO-5003-4 (21 413
Oardner W3-5003-4 (21 413
Gardner WQ-5003-4 (21 413
Laborer WQ-3502-3 (19 910
Laborer W3-3502-3 (19 910
Laborer WQ-3502-3 (19 910
Laborer WQ-3502-3 (19 910
Laborer WQ-3502-3 (19 910
Laborer W3-3502-2 (18 386
Laborer WQ-3502-2 (.826) 111 510
Pluaber Worker WQ-4206-7 (24 439
Halnt. Worker WQ-4749-5/7 (24 439
Halnt. Worker WQ-4749-5/7 (24 439
Halnt. Worker WO-4749-5/7 (24 439
Kaint. Worker WO-4749-5/7 (24 439
Equip. Bpr/Hech WO-5352-8/10 (26 901
Pluaber Wkr WQ-4206-7 (24 439
Pluaber Wkr WQ-4206-7 (24 439
SUBTOTAL (2,213 997
Trani. General Foreaan WS-4701-14 (42 178
Auto. Tram. Spec. GS-2150-7/9 (28 001
Production Controller GS- 1 152-7 (22 887
Coaputer Operator GS-322-5 (18 481
Acctne; Tech. GS-525-4 (16 517
luto. Equip. Dlapatcher GS-2151-4 (16 517
Clerk GS-303-3 (14 714
Trana. Equip. Opr. Foreaan WS-5701-10 (26 901
Autoaotite Hech. Foreaan WS-S823-10 (26 901
Engin. Equip. Oper. Leader WL-5716-10 (26 901
Autoaotlte Hech. Leader WL-5823-10 (28 508
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Carpenter WG-4607-9 (26,108
kUint. Hech. WG 4749-9 (26.108
Tool Ba. Hech. WG-4801-8/9 (26,108
Electrical Worker WG 2805-5/8 (25,315
Electrical Worker WO-2805-5/8 (25,315
Electrical Worker WO-2805-5/8 (25,315
Halnt. Worker W3-4749-8 (25,315
Halnt. Worker WO-4749-8 (25,315
Halnt. Worker WO-4749-8 (25.315
Halnt. Worker WO-4749-8 (25.315
Halnt. Worker WO-4749-8 (25.315
Halnt. Worker WO-4749-8 (25.315
Halnt. Worker WO-4749-8 (25.315
Halnt. Worker WQ-4749-8 (25.315
Haint. Worker WQ-4749-8 (25.315
Peat Controller WO-5026-5/7/9 (26,108
Pest Controller WQ-5026-5/7/9 (26,108
Peat Controller WO-5026-5/7/9 (26,108
B7AC Worker WG 5301-8 (25,315
BVAC Worker WQ-5301-8 (25,315
BVAC Worker WQ-5301-8 (25,315
HVAC Worker WQ-5301-8 (25,315
Equip. Bepalrer WQ-5352-8 (25,315
Equip. Bepalrer WQ-5352-8 (25,315
Poaer Syateaa Hech WO-5378-10 (26,901
Swla. Pool Opr. WO-5486-8 (25,315
Sign Painter WQ 4104-7 (24,439
Port. Equip. Opr. WO-5478-6 (23,562











Pluaber Worker WQ-4206-7 (24.439
Halnt. Worker WQ-4749-7 (24,439
Haint. Worker WO-4749-7 (24,439
Halnt. Worker WO-4749-7 (24,439
Halnt. Worker WO-4749-7 (24,439
Equip. Bpr. /Hech WO-5352-8/10 (26,901
Pluaber Worker WQ-4206-7 (24,439
Pluaber Worker WQ-4206-7 (24,439
SUBTOTAL (2,168,859
Trana. General Foreaan WS-4701-14 (42,178
Auto. Trana. Spec. GS-2150-7/9 (28,001
Production Controller OS- 1 152-7 (22,887
Coaputer Operator GS-322-5 (18.481
Acctn| Tech. GS-525-4 (16.517
Auto. Equip. Dlapatcher GS-2151-4 (16,517
Clerk OS-303-3 (14,714
Trana. Equip. Opr. Foreaan WS-5701-10 (26,901
Autoaotive Hech. Foreaan WS-5823-IO (26,901
Engln. Equip. Oper. Leader WL-5716-10 (26,901
Autoaotive Hech. Leader WQ-5823-10 (28,508




M70 Leader (IISTB) WL-5803-7
Auto Bepair Imp MQ-5823-11
Mobile Equip. Metal Mecb M3-3809-10
Bigger WO-3210-10
Engr. Equip. Opr. MG-5716-10
Engr. Equip. Opr. MO-5716-10
Engr. Equip. Opr. 10-3716-10
Heavy Mobile Equip. Mecb. MO-5803-8/10
Heavy Mobile Equip. Meek. MO-5803-8/10









MVO K- 3703 8





Irlleld Clear Equip Opr MO 3767-7
lrfleld Clear Equip Opr «0 5787-7
Irlleld Clear Equip Opr MO 5767-7
irlleld Clear Equip Opr MB 5767-7
lrfleld Clear Equip Opr MO 5767-7
Tire Bpr. Heavy MO-4504-6
MVO MO-5703-6
Tool 1 Part. Ittnd MO-6004-3/6
MVO MQ-5703-3
Mobile Equip Serv MO- 3806 -3
SUBTOTAL
Hazardous Haste Handler MO-6501-7
Baiardous taste Handler MB 6501 -6
126,797 MVO Leader VL-5803-8 126,797
128,839 MVO Leader (1ISTR) ML-5703-7 126,839
127,757 iuto Bepalr Insp 13-5823- 11 •27,757
126,901 Mobile Equip. Metal Meek MO-3809-10 126,901
126,901 Bigger 10-5210-10 126,901
126,901 Engr. Equip. Opr. MG-5716-10 126,901
126,901 Engr. Equip. Opr. M3-57I6-10 126,901
128,901 Engr. Equip. Opr. MO-5718-10 126,901
126,901 Heavy Mobile Equip. Mecb. MO-5803-8/10 126,001
126.901 Beavy Mobile Equip. Mecb. MO-5803-8/10 126,901
126,901 Beavy Mrblle Equip. Mecb. MO-3803-8/10 126,001
126,901 luto Mechanic MQ-3823-8/10 126,901
126,901 iuto Mechanic VO-5823-8/10 126,001
126,901 luto Mechanic VQ-5823-8/10 126,901
126,901 luto Mecbanic MB-5823-8/10 126,001
126,901 luto Mecbanic W-5823-8/10 126,001
126,901 luto Mecbanic V0-5823-6/8/1O 126,001
125,315 MVO MO- 3703-8 123,315
125,315 MVO WO-3703-8 125,315
125,313 MVO MO-3703-8 123,315
123,313 luto Worker M3-S823-3/8 125,3)5
123,315 luto Morker MO-5823-3/8 125,313
124,439 MVO M3-5707-7 124,430
124,439 MVO MO-5707-7 124,430
124,439 MVO MO-5707-7 124,430
124,439 Airfield Clear Equip Opr MO 3767-7 124,430
124,439 Airfield Clear Equip Opr M0 5767-7 124,430
124,439 Airfield Clear Equip Opr MO 5767-7 124,430
124,439 Airfield Clear Equip Opr MO 5767-7 124,439
124.439 Airfield Clear Equip Opr 10 5767-7 124,439
123.562 Tire Bpr. Beavy MO-5801-6 123,562
123,562 MVO MO-5703-6 123,362
123.362 Tool 1 Parts Ittnd MO 6904-5/6 123,562
122.748 MVO MO-5703-5 122,748









Hazardous Maste Handler MO 6501-7 124,430
Hazardous Maste Handler MB 6501-6 123,562
SUBTOTAL 148,001 SUBTOTAL 148,001
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. OfPARTMCNT OF THE NAVY






Chief of Naval Operation!
iSouiDdiag Officer, uml Air Bt»tion,FCQftlTo I
BUbj: COHHBBCXAl ACTIVITIES (CA) PH0C5AM CQ8T STUDY HUKBSS
CT 2992 AT NAVAL AH STATION
Bef; (I) HAS
(b) HAfl
(a) OPNAVXNflT 4160. 7B
2S1913Z Jul 90
1121062 tUy 90
1. Continued in-houee p«rf ocaunct of the subject function ii
authorised at • re«ult of the eoit comparison data reflected ia
references (a) and (b). Befaronce (o) requires that cno (OP-443)
be provided a written explanation if:
a. implementation of the Moat Efficient organisation (KBO)
dees not begin within jo daya from the date of this latter;
and/or
b. aftar 90 d«y». it appears tha loco will not ba folly
laplemAntAd witnin 180 days from the date of tnia latttc^
2. Please feel fra« to oontaot CNO (OP-443) if you have any
question! regarding thie repotting requirement. The oro point of
















































1 PW Genera! Foreman WS-15
1 Production Controller GS-09
1 Clerk Typist GS-04
TEAM 1
1 Maint Foreman WS-10
1 Prod Controller GS-09
2 Electricians WG-10







1 St Metal Mech WG-8/10







2 Maint Wrkr WG-08
1 Toolroom Mech WG-8/10
1 Gardener WG-04
2 Pest Controller WG-7/9
1 Equip Mech WG-8/10
2 Equip Repairer WG-08
1 Power Support Ssyt Mech
WG-10
1 Swim Pool Oper WG-08
TEAM 2
1 Maint Foreman WG-10



















2 Plumber wrkr WG-07
5 Maint Wrkr WG-08
2 Miant Wrkr WG-07
2 Gardener WG-04








1 Maint Foreman WG-10
1 Elect Alarm Sys Mech
WG-10
1 Electronics Meet i WG-10
1 Electrician WG-10





1 Sign Painter WG-07
1 Plumber WG-09
1 Plumber Wrkr WG-07
2 Maint Wrkr WG-08
2 Maint Wrkr WG-07
3 HVAC Mech WG-10
4 HVAC Wrkr WG-10
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MEO TRANSITION PLAN
NLT DATES RESPONSIBILITY ACTION
07-01-90 180/190/300 Propose changes to PWS; submit to 000 via 100B













- Identify affected military/monitor military PCS
- Reassign military
- Identify safety issues
- Identify other functional support
08-27-90 120 SF-171 update notices to all employees
08-31-90 180/190 Establish/classify MEO position descriptions
09-01-90 000 Certify and publish final MEO
09-01-90 100C Release waiver request meesage
09-15-90 180/190/300 Submit SF-52s/List of positions to be abolished
09-22-90 100B/100C Reconcile SF-52s/List vs MEO & submit to board
09-22-90 120 Request retention register
09-23-90 120 Conduct RTF-Determine employee entitlements
11-17-90 120 Notify Union
11-27-90 120 Issue RTF notices
11-27-90 120 Initiate MEO recruitments
11-28-90 to
01-27-91
120 Adjusting/modifying RTF actions
11-28-90 to
01-27-91








120/180/190/300 Cross-training of affected employees
01-27-91 120 Fill MEO positions
03-27-91 100B Establish baseline for audit of MEO expenditures
Continuous 120/100B Assess progress of MEO transition plan
Exhibit 2-4
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D. CASE NUMBER THREE—OSD IN CHARGE
1. Introduction—A Change of Players
"CDR Knight, welcome." CDR Alexander greeted his
relief. "I'm glad we are able to at least have a day or two
turnover. I trust you used this morning to meet some of the
staff and to get to know the "lay of the land." This
afternoon I would like to discuss with you some of the more
recent changes that have taken place in PWD Kensington, and to
give you a "heads up" on things waiting for you in the wings."
After relaying to CDR Knight the events of the past
three years, the conversation turned to the immediate future.
2. To Be Or Not To Be. . .Consolidated
In this day and age of reductions, the military is
being asked to do more with less (less personnel, equipment,
and dollars) . And, as appears to be the case more and more,
OSD has determined that they are the best ones to decide just
how it is the various military organizations are to respond.
This is particularly true for Navy Public Works departments
(and for the respective Air Force, Army and DLA base
engineering services) . OSD's findings and recommendations are
recorded in the Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) of
Dec 1990 (Exhibit 3-1)
.
For the Public Works Department on board NAS
Kensington, this will mean consolidation with Public Works
Center Edgewater some 30 miles away (i.e., PWD Kensington will
77
no longer exist) . The Public Works Center operates similar to
a NIF function in that it provides its services on a
reimbursable basis.
PWD Kensington received notification of the DMRD and
a preliminary implementation plan in late May 1991, only four
months after the CNO approved MEO (Exhibit 3-2)
.
PWD Kensington, in an effort to contribute to the
"best business decision" suggested by PWC Edgewater, prepared
a cost comparison of PWD and PWC costs (Exhibit 3-3)
.
According to the budget analyst's cost comparison
which is comprised of best estimates and actual PWC costs, NAS
Kensington will spend more out of pocket to provide the same
services as PWD.
It should be noted, though, that there is a potential
for cost savings particularly in the area of utilities and
transportation, however, it is difficult to guantify. For
example, under the current PWD system the replacement of
defective steam lines would reguire the use of special project
money (i.e., over and above that which is in the budget);
under the PWC system there would be no additional outlay as
this is already factored into the rates charged. A similar
situation exists when a vehicle or piece of heavy equipment
needs to be replaced.
78
3. The Challenge
"So as you can see, CDR Knight, uncertain times lie
ahead. You are in a position where you must decide whether to
fight consolidation or not, what to do about the department's
low morale and under-staffing, and how to implement/manage a
change in such chaotic times. I wish you well sir." With
that CDR Alexander turned over the reins.
79
NO. 967
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT REPORT DECISION
SUBJECT : Base Engineering Services
POP COMPONENTS : Aray, Navy, Air Force, DLA
ISSUE : Can cose reductions and improved efficiencies be achieved
through consolidations of base engineering services, reductions of
excess personnel, -conooies of scale, improved utilization of
military manpower, and reor 1 ent a
t
ion of the base engineering
financial and management programs to escabllsh a business
management approach to real property maintenance?
(TOA. Dollars in Millions)
FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993
Service Estimate 5,664 $,696 6,079
Alternative Estimate - -50 -104
SUMMARY OF EVALUATION : The evaluation was based on an extensive
fact -finding effort and field visits to a cros s - sect Ion of major
military in^rall atinn* nf *«rh nf rh» Strvicit . OSD and Service
silitary and civilian experts at all levels participated in the
review. The evaluation addresses five major areas which are:
(1) Consolidation of Base Engineering Services; savings will be
achieved by reduction of duplicative aanagement and support
structures, economies of scale in material purchases and
contracting, and more efficient utilization of major equipment,
maintenance shops, and specialized personnel; (Z) Establish Public
Works Centers; through establishment of Industrial funded public
works centers serving all installations within the geographic area
of each center, efficiencies in program management, planning, and
budgeting will occur; (3) Application of Economic Analysis
Techniques; application of coftaonly accepted economic analysis
techniques will help to ensure that prudent and economic capital
Investments are made; (4) Improve Installation Master Planning;
policy direction will help ensure individual installations have
incorporated both downsizing plans and procedures to ensure that
old, inefficient structures that are a burden on maintenance
accounts are eliminated; and (S) The Air Force alternative approved
by the Secretary for Base Engineering Services.
ALTERNATIVE BSTIHATB : Approve this alternative for programmatic,
organizational, and policy changes which will improve base
engineering services and real property maintenance. The savings
from this alternative are $50 million in FY 1992 and an estimated
$602 million in cost avoidance over the six-year Defense Program.
DECISION THE COMPTROLLER APPROVED THE ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATE. Date Pjj~ ^0 ^^90




DETAIL OF EVA1UATI0N :
QACfGROOTDi The OoO infrastructure has an estimated plant
replacement value cf over $600 billion. The primary planning,
management, and maintenance support for this infrastructure occurs
at the installation level snd is performed by the Director ot
Engineering and Housing organizations in the Army, Public Worka
Centers y PWC * s ) or Public Works Departments in the Navy, or Civil
Engineering Support Squadrons in the Air Force. This base civil
engineering function provides a range of services for the host
.nstallation and ail tenants including: providing utilities,
either in-house or contracted engineering services (auch as
custodial, snow removal, grounds maintenance, refuse removal), a
mixture of contract and in-house services for all maintenance,
repair, and minor construction for all buildings, structures,
family housing, and other facilities, operation of in-house utility
a plants, and installation master planning and environmental support
~ services. These programs are funded at approximately 55.7 billion
' annually (excluding military pay), and are executed by over
q 65,000 personnel.
c
n The installation engineering activity does the Initial development
of proposed military construction projects, consistent with the
» installation master plan, then after funding is obtained, passes
these projects to regional CorpB of Engineers or Naval Facilities
O Engineering Command offices who execute the projects.
m
* The challenges facing base engineering service organizations are
extensive. They stem from the rapidly aging Infrastructure which
n to a large extent was developed in the World War II and Korean war
* periods and have beer, compounded by constrained budgets over the
n past IS years. In addition, the emphasis in recent years on
* environmental concerns has generated large expenses and clean-up
n operations that are further tasking manpower and financial
* resources. With the budget and force structure reductions
programmed for the coming years it will be necessary to pursue
innovative solutions to these problems and take appropriate actions
to develop a business management orientation that will ensure the
most cost-effective and efficient programs possible.
There are significant policy and programmatic differences between
the Services and Defense Agencies in terms of the level of
resources dedicated to these programs, the mixture of contract
versus in-house operations, the use of military manpower, and the
metnods of financing and budgeting. Differences also exist as to
whether the "owner" of the real property is line organizations and
tenant commands or the civil engineering organization. Within the
Army the Director of Engineering and Housing reports to the
commander of the Installation who is the landlord of the base. In
the Navy, the Public Works Center does not work for a particular




case commander; rather, the PWC Commander reports to the senior
flag officer In the sees who has overall administrative
responsibility for the rival activities in a region. PWC
Commanders directly own the buildings and facilities they occupy
and the common utility infrastructure that serves all the bases and
tenants. At major naval bases such as Norfolk and Pearl Harbor,
each tenant command owns the facilities they occupy. The Kit Force
is similar to the Army in that each base has a wing commander who
owns Che base. The Civil Engineer, who is a support squadron
commander, reports to the wing.
As a part of the DMR study special attention was paid to the
perception of customers as to responsiveness and the quality of
service provided by each Service program. This effort identified
several common proDleras and also several key factors that Impact on
any successful consolidation. Commanders feel they need to
directly control their base engineering programs so that they may
direct the amount of resources applied and the priorities of
accomplishment. Commanders want responsive service and often feel
projects take too long to program and accomplish. Commanders, as
expected, tend to focus on operational requirements and quality-of-
life projects that most directly impact unit effectiveness and
morale. Within the Army and Air Force this forces the Civil
engineer to compete «mj l-bby Cor the resources needed to maintain
both general facilities and the infrastructure (utilities and
roads), which are vital to an installation but are often taken for
granted by senior operational officers and tenant commanders. In
the Air Force this problem is reduced somewhat because of the
overall Air Force policy that emphasizes facilities and the
generally higher levels of manpower and funding the Air Force
provides. However, in the Army this translates to very minimal
funding support. This is evidenced by the fact that since FY 1986
the Army has reprogrammed large amounts of dollars appropriated for
RPH into other operations accounts. For the most part this problem
has been solved in the Navy. Navy support for the infrastructure
is paid for by surcharges built directly into the industrial fund
rates the PWC charges customers. Also, major Navy tenant commands
cwn their facilities and purchase the services they need. This
combination of ownership, and control of priorities and resources
stimulates better real property management and greater
understanding in the Navy. The Navy appears to have reached the
proper balance of line control over the PWC activities as well.
When PWC s were originally formed they were Independent of local
control and reported to regional Naval Facilities Engineering
Command offices. This system did not work effectively, and the
Navy changed it some years ago. With PWC'a now reporting to local
senior operational flag officers, Navy commanders now are pleased
with their responsiveness. In response to questions from the
DHR Team at major naval bases, shipyard commanders and other major
tenants rated PWC's highly. They acknowledged that they would




rather have tneir own pudlc wotkb departments, but that such a
Structure would be wasteful. In fact, the Navy reports that where
they have consolidated functions they have achieved an average cost
avoidance of 5\ annually . It appears that establishing a business
management approach to RPM and engineering services both saves
money and improves overall program effectiveness.
In matcing facility investment decisions it appears that the
constrained resourcing climate has led managers toward funding
requirements based on wnat type of money or resource is available,
not wnether the investment is economically sound. Examples include
use of military manpower, due to its availability, in lieu of
contractor support, or making uneconomical repairs and renovations
to facilities because of the perception that RPM money is more
readily available than military construction funds.
from a functional perspective all Service base engineering
operations are very similar in their fundamental management and
wor* processes. Each is organized into generally similar
functional divisions that are dedicated tot family housing
maintenance, engineering support, environmental services, supply
and contracting, service or trouble call sections, sections which
perform major projects, and support or command staffs. Each
Service has programs with mixtures of preventive and cyclic
maintenance, major repair projects, and facility review boards of
some kind that advise commanders on the allocation of budget
resources. Each Service program includes annual or biannual
facility condition inspections or surveys/ and each develops annual
and multiyear work programs. All the programs use management
indicators which are consistent such as time goals for
accomplishment of trouble calls, project, labor, and material cost
standards, and utility performance indicators such as the number of
outages per month. Increasing consolidation apparently would not
necessitate changing basic work processes, management control
techniques, or standards.
Although the similarities are great, the DMR study revealed that in
numerous areas programs developed by one Service could be adopted
DoD-wide and generate significant cost savings.
Further, more uniform policies on investment decision processes and
real property management are necessary. In response to internal
studies and congressional requests, DoD has implemented new methods
of assessing facilities investments. These include comparisons of
funding to plant replacement value (PRV), reviewing facility
investments from a capital budget perspective, and assessing new
construction in conjunction with major repair to obtain a complete
picture of capital investments.





Consolidation of Sase Engineering Services: Throughout the
'Jnitcd States there are numerous locations where military
i ns t a 1 1 ar ions are in close proximity to each other, and in some
instances share a common border. In these cases each installation
maintains a separate base engineering program, maintenance
programs, r.ajor equipment pool, specialized work crews, maintenance
>upport production sneps, and other services. Savings and
increased efficiencies are possible through consolidation of these
programs and by reorientation ot theso programs toward a business-
.sanageraerit basis for operations. Such consolidation will eliminate
duplicative management and support staffs and allow for economies
of scale in both procurement of supplies and in contracting for
services. Other areas where economies will be achieved include
design services, master planning, laboratory services, hazardous
waste and asbestos renoval and disposal, heavy equipment pool
sharing, maintenance of equipment and vehicles, and other areas.
lj^_^jL»JLLr'j_r?lour_ce_s^ .h_i8hJ^L.i_T a ->.«»«d
_P er. 5.onnc l_ * n ^ specialized work
crews can be more efficient ly u tilized. Evidence his shown that in
aealing with regional utility companies, single mult i- Lnstallat ion
reduced rates can be negotiated, peak load shaving programs are
sore effective, and cooperative agreements on environmental Issues
are expedi ted
.
Potential consolidations are limited by geographic factors and
program scale factors. The Navy experience is that to be
successful a PWC serves all commands located within approximately a
one and one-half hour drive of the Center. Secondly, that the
cumulative dollar value of the programs supported should be a
minimum of approximately {60.0 million annually. There are a
number of locations where such a consolidation appears warranted
both on an Int ra-Servlce basis, and on an Inter-Service basis.
Although the Navy has demonstrated success with over a dozen major
Public works Centers, the Air Force cites the San Antonio Real
Property Maintenance Agency (SARPMA) as an example of a failed
consolidation. In SARPMA the engineering programs of five major
installations (four Air Force and one Army), were combined in 1977.
The organization was terminated approximately ten years later,




based en its perceived inefficiencies. Although numerous studies
on SARPMA have been conducted, clear conclusions as to why it did
not achieve its objectives are hard to identify. The Air Force
contends Chat :ne iJCk of command and control that individual
installation commanders lost through SAKPMA was too high a price to
pay. They turther contend that it did not save money and was an
unresponsive bureaucracy. The DMR Team reviewed the history of
SARPHA and discovered several basic facts. First, comparisons o£
savings are not possible due to the dramatic differences in program
funding, environmental issues, hiring freetes, and other factors
;hat impacted DoD during '.he ten-vear period SARPMA existed.
Second, :he original concepts of organization, supply, personnel,
procurement support, automated data processing (ADP) support, and
the client base SARPMA was to serve never materialized. In fact,
manv of the fundamental concepts necessary to success were never
implemented. In addition, the detailed studies of SARPMA describe
such a range of fundamental management problems and mistakes that
to blame its failure on consolidation alone is unwarranted.
examples include: severe unde rs t af
f
ing for years at a time; the
external activity providing procurement and accounting support to
SARPMA did not pay the bills for so long a period that vendors
began to refuse to deal with SARPMA; the restrictions placed on
SAKPMA to exercise fundamental industrial fund controls such as
matching onboard staffing to work load; and an ADP tyicea that was
not capable of processing the volume of data required.
In comparing SAKPMA with the many other examples of successful
consolidation, it appears prudent to learn from these mistakes but
now to focus on the potential for future savings and efficiencies,
rather than to dwell on past errors. Recommendations for
consolidation are described below.
The alternative recommends the Public Works Center concept for
adoption DoD-wide to both achieve the economies resulting from
consolidation and the efficiencies inherent in this type of
organi :at ion. To ensure effective end cost -efficient operations
the alternative would also provide that ail consolidations be based
on the following principles:
• Public Works Centers should be established in all Services on
primarily an Intra-Service geographic basis. However, in
those geographic locations where one Service establishes a
PWC and is clearly the predominate DoD component, and no
other Service has sufficient work load to warrant a PWC,
negotiated Inter-Service Support Agreements should be
established where the PWC provides support to all DoD
installations in the region, as appropriate for local
circumstances. In most instances this will result in Intra-
Service centers serving only activities within their own
Service for facility maintenance and major repair projects.




design services for projects, small project contracting
support, specialized skills or equipment requirements, annual
program support for vehicle maintenance, utility operation,
trouble call service, shop support, custodial, refuse, and
other ground maintenance type contracts. When Inter-Service
Support Agreements are established for some or all of the
functions listed above, they should be for two-year periods
to increase stability and minimize cost. In several areas
the site of the programs and location of forces would support
two or more centers, each managed by a different Service.
Where this is possible each center should be established.
• Intrt-Servlce Centers should be established serving all
activities within a maximum one and one-half to two-hour
driving distance. Beyond that distance the travel time and
transportation expenses make centers inefficient. In
' addition, centers should not be established where the total
~ local program is less than $50.0 million annually.
o
2 -#- All centers should be either industrially funded or operate
on a reimbursable unit cost basis. This will place the
operations on a business management basis where full costing
„
and control of indirect expenses is inherent in operations.
-,
g i». All centers should utilize published stabilized labor, Job,
< and product rates so that customers may effectively program
" and budget for requirements.
e Centers should own the buildings they occupy and the common
z utility and roads infrastructure they manage. Support for
these items will be generated by published surcharges built
" into their product and labor cost structure. All other
? facilities should remain under the ownership and control of
z installation commanders and/or base tenant commanders, who
£ will retain control of funding and execution priorities for
their f aci 1 i t ies .
e Public Works Centers should be placed in the Service chains
of command in such a manner as to ensure responsiveness to
line managers and operational command needs. The Navy model
may serve as an initial example, but each Service must design
and implement these relationships according to their
respective requirements.
^ Each PWC should establish formal face-to-face customer
communication mechanisms, to include publishing annuel
corporate plans, and hosting as a minimum annual commanders'
briefings, where direct exchanges with clients on new
requirements, technology, and problem resolution can be
conducted.




-^ Service Public Works Centers should provide customers with
on-line ADP communications that will allow customers
visibility for the status of their work, detailed, cost
reporting, and timely management reports. In this regard the
Air Force ADP node 1 could serve as a prototype unless mote
effective systems are developed by the Services.
• To ensure responsive and quality work, PWC's will provide
quality warranties on work, allow customer sign-off and
acceptance on projects, and provide firm, fixed-price support
using the published rates wherever possible. For those
projects where the scope of work is not clearly defined,
negotiated cost reimbursable arrangements based on published
rates should be used.
• Each center will have full authority to match work load with
staffing, without the restrictions of annual manpower ceiling
constraints, co include the direct personnel management
support required to operate on a manage- to-payroll basis.
Each center should have authority to capitalize and
depreciate in their operating budgets investments for major
equipment, ADP, vehicles, and internal center-owned major
repairs of real property.
Each center will be provided with procurement warrants for
purchasing supplies up to J2S.OO0 per '
allow centers to maintain inventories
_-»--:- i . ._j ^ . l _ _ ii i_j e.
line item. This will
Each center will be provided with contracting authority
(either in-house or dedicated) to contract for small projects
on a job order requirements basis such as the Army JOC




• Each center should own, operate, and manage the major
transportation fleet that services their assigned region. To
include maintenance and capital budget investment control,
centers should operate lease and short-term rental programs
for til customers. The Services should explore establishment
of programs to operate and manage rental fleets on the lame
basis as major private sector firms in order to maximixe
savings to OoD.
)k Customer installations should retain the minimal in-house
engineering capability sufficient to advise commanders,
conduct planning, programming, and budgeting, advise
commanders on setting priorities, conduct liaison functions
with centers, and to manage self-help programs.
The alternative recommends that the following centers be











Army MDW, Northern VA
NAVY:
PWC, Norfolk, VA (expansion) PWC Charleston, SC
Pensacola, FL (expansion) PWC Guam (expansion)
PWC, San Diego, CA (expansion) PWC, Jacksonville, FL
PWC, San Francisco, CA (expansion) Washington DC, Navy Yard
Great Lakes, IL (expansion) NS New York, NY (FY 1994)
PWC, Pearl Harbor, HI (expansion) Long Beach, CA (FY 1994)
AIR FORCE:
Peterson AfB, CO
Lowry AfB , CO
LiCCle Rock AfB, AR
Offutt AfB, NE































The alternative estimates that adoption of this program will
achieve cost avoidance of sppror imate ly $150.0 million annually,
and establish a bus iness -or i«nt ed structure that will substantially
increase productivity and efficiency. Accordingly, the alternative
provides for the Services and Defense Agencies to prepare plans Tor
implementing the establishment of Public Works Centers. These
plans are to be prepared under the guidance And direction of
USDIA) , consistent with the principles and time tables outlined
jbov« . Afn-r coordination with DoD(C), the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition shall submit sucn plans, im-luuing
adjustments required due to subsequent base closure decisions, and
detailed transfer of function and resource realignment requirements
to DepSecDef for approval bv June 30, 1991, for centers to be
established effective FY 1992, and by June 30, 1992, for centers to
be established effective FY 1993.
Application of Economic Analysis Techniques: In reviewing the
methods used by the Services to make financial management
investment decisions for Tepair, renovation, or new construction of
facilities, the studv revealed that commonly accepted economic
analysis (EA) techniques are not regularly employed. Although
there was abundant evidence that economic engineering evaluations
were conducted to determine work processes, materials, and methods
at over 14 major installations reviewed, few actual economic
analysis studies were conducted to determine whether facility
requirements should be satisfied through the status quo, minor
alterations of existing facilities, renovation of existing assets,
or new construction. Where EA's were conducted many of the studies
assigned the same economic life to improvements as new construe*
tion, which is a blatantly faulty assumption. Studies conducted
showed a pattern of poor quality-, unrealistic assumptions, data of
low reliability or validity used in the cost computations; or the
EA's were not structured in accordance with OoO guidelines for
conducting economic analysis. It would appear that to make sound
economic decisions commanders must first have a clear understanding
of the economic impact of available alternatives.
In order to ensure prudent and economic investments during the
current constrained budget climate, these basic business practices
would appear necessary. Accordingly, the alternative would require
an economic analysis be prepared to support the investment decision
for all construction, major repair, or renovation project estimated
to cost in excess of $2.0 million.
Installation Master Planning Policies: The Services ell employ
multiyear installation master planning programs designed to keep
the installation infrastructure postured to support projected force
structure and operational requirements. However, with the
exception of the Air Force, most of these plans focus too heavily
on future expansions and modernization. On a typical base if a
10




snape or pasi uicn tiucieni economic lire, insciuicion
commanders either desire co support the operational elements, or
find it difficult to turn down requests for space. In addition,
once a tenant command assumes ownership or control of a facility it
usually retains all such space indefinitely.
As a consequence, many installations have partially used or under-
utilized facilities which create a drain on maintenance resources,
if, for example, a warehouse is only half used, the entire building
must still be heated and maintained.
Of the installations visited by the DMR Team, only the Air Force
bases had proactive programs to downsize their installation. Civen
'f>f projected reductions in funding and force structure it would
appear necessary for all OoO installations to follow u«i» approach.
Closing entire bases is the most effective method of downsizing.
However, even those installations scheduled to be retained in the
inventory would benefit from formal plans requiring maximizing
facility utilization and elimination of inefficient and unneeded
facilities. The alternative would require all Services to ensure
that installation master plans include formal programs for
downsizing the infrastructure where appropriate.
Air Force Initiatives: The most striking difference between the
Services is the method used for employing military personnel in
support of real property maintenance (RPM) and base engineering
services. Tho Aray and th# Navy employ very few military and
civilian personnel in their RPM programs. At a typical Army or
Navy installation only 2\ to 5* of personnel are military.
Conversely, at each Air Force installation SOI to 601 of all
personnel supporting base engineering services and RPM are
military. The Air Force rationale for employing high numbers of
active duty military personnel within the continental United States
and overseas in their base engineering functions, is that it
represents excellent training in support of wartime missions.
Under the current Air Force program every Air Force Wing and
Squadron worldwide has an assigned PRIME BEEF team. These teams
are also SOI of every Air Force base civil engineering and
maintenance work force. They are trained for deployment and spend
1 S l of their time in strictly military skills training (air base
security, small arms, basic military skills, ordnance disposal.
11





runway repair, airfield f
i
ref i ght 1 ng , etc.). Tha PRIME BEEF
wartime mission is to provide deployable engineering support to
restore overseas bases that have suffered attacks and to maintain
and operate these bases in support of Air Force operational
requi rements
.
The Air Force undoubtedly needs to retain personnel to support the
vital PRIME BEEF mission. Recent events have helped to underscore
this need as PRIME BEEF units are currently supporting Middle East
operations. However, consistent with planned force structure
reductions over the six-year Defense Program, base closures, and
the revised worldwide threat analysis set forth in the current
Defense Culdance; substantial reductions in overall PRIME BEEF are
both possible and necessary.
The Air Force has proposed several initiatives to reduce costs in
the base engineering and real property maintenance program. The
alternative recommends approval of these Air Force initiatives as
outlined below:
fy- Reorganization of Base Engineering Support Functions. This
initiative will reduce overhead costs, eliminate redundant layers
of positions, and apply a range of Total Quality Management (TQM)
principles to achieve reduced costs, without reducing quality of
service at all Installations. The Air Force will transition fro
functional-based, task-oriented organization structure to a
product-oriented structure. This will include establishment of
product teams responsible for the complete end product. The teams
will be multi-skilled, versatile, and responsive to customer needs.
• Transition to multi-skilled craftsmen. Complimenting the
transition to product oriented organizations, the Air Force plans
to reduce the number of separate skill designators (AFSC's) for
military positions. For both military and civilian positions the
goal will be to develop multiskilled craftsmen to support the
product -oriented work teams.
• Reduce military personnel and convert other unneeded military
personnel to civilian positions. It is cost-effective and prudent
to convert excess military positions to civilian positions.
Civilian petitions art net required to Maintain military COmDat
skills resulting In a 15% productivity enhancement. In addition,
in light of the changing threat environment and adjustments to war
plans, overall PRIME BEEF manning may be reduced.
The inclusion of Public Work Center functions at the designated
Air Force installations, as previously addressed, shall be
complimentary with the above Air Force initiatives. Air Force
public work center functions and responsibilities should be
consistent with the principles described above for operation of
12




FW'C's. At those installations where Air Force PWC's ere to be
established the cognizant Engineering Support Group or Squadron and
its assigned civilian elements will provide the PWC Int ra-Service
support. The establishment of a PWC function will not duplicate
existing engineering support organizations.
These ?s as identified under
n addi t ion , the
SUMMARY OF ADJUSTMENTS :
( $ in Millions)




ARMY 08M -2S.S -52. 9 -54.7 -S6.4 -58.2 -60.0
NAVY 06M -25.5 -52.9 -S4.7 -56.4 -58.2 -60.0
DLA 06M »1.0 -2.1 *2.2 »2.3 *2.4 »2.5
TOt*l DMRD -50.0 -103.7 -107.2 -110.5 -114.0 -117.
S
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The following is a record of the approved adjustments for the Air
PotCAi The TOA Adjustments fcr Air r"orce a r > »cp*r*t c 1^ recorded
by PBD, and are not additive to the Summary of Adjustments for this
DMRD.
(J in millions)
FY 92 FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97
Air Force
Reductions:
(Establishment of PWC ' s
and other Air Force
Initiatives)
MILPERS, AF -37.7 -80.4 -131.0 -190.3 -224.8 -244.0
Air Force O&M -11.8 -2.6 1.5 *1.9 »6.0 -1.3
Total Air Force -49. S -83.0 -129.5 -188.4 -218.8 -245.3
(Military End Strength)
b
FY 92 FY 93 FY 94 FT 9S FY 96 FY 97 *
v
Air Force -1,122 -2,296 -3,638 -5,124 -S,87S -6,185 >
(Civilian Personnel End Strength) j
k
FY 92 FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FT 97 ;
Air Force t
USDH -330 -71 *39 *48 *147 -30 S
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER NAVAL BASE
Md, " r" TO '
Ser 003/596
22 MAY 1991
From: Commander, Naval Base,
To: Commander in Chief, U.S.. Pacific Fleet
Subj: IMPLEMENTATION OF DEFENSE MANAGEMENT REVIEW DECISION (DMRD) 967
Ref: (a) CINCPACFLT 082041Z May 91
Encl: (1) PWC l/NAS Expansion Tentative POA&M
1. As directed by reference (a), enclosure (1) is forwarded as a preliminary
implementation plan for expansion of Navy Public Works Center (PUC),f|B||
to Naval Air Station (NAS) ^—j. This plan was developed after
consultation between PWC |BIBMB and NAS!! staff s.
2. A "best business decision" process will be applied to all functions under
consideration for transfer to ensure economical use of scarce base operating
support dollars. Functions offering the greatest cost savings to the Navy
will be transferred early with all functions being transferred only after
careful review.
3. It is planned that none of the actions listed in enclosure (1) will begin
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PLAN OF ACTION & MILESTONES
PHASE 1 - INITIAL ACTIONS :
A. Identify Vry managers from PWC HH| ancl ^ rom N^S|
will provide Command guidance and policy for the study of functions.
who
B. Identify, and establish functional study teams from each command to
facilitate and orchestrate the details of the study. These teams are capable
of addressing issues such as financial, personnel, equipment, facilities, in-
house and contracted workloads, material support, ADP, payroll, etc.
C. PMC and NAS(^ familiarize each other on their
organization structures and functions.
D. PWC MHHHI and NAS HHHi jointly provide initial briefing to




and NAS^f funct ional study teams together
Set up administrative support for teams.
F. Establish a communications system to provide periodic information to
effected PWD employees to reduce rumors and fears. (Use briefings, news-
letters, etc.)
PHASE 2 - BEST BUSINESS DECISION STUDY :
A. Identify functions under consideration for transfer.
B. Perform budget impact analysis on identified functions.
C. Determine which functions are most economical to transfer.
PHASE 3 - CONDUCT SITE SURVEYS :
A. Identify PWD customers and jointly provide initial briefings
concerning the expansion.
B. Identify PWD assets (facilities, utility systems, equipment, etc.)
and their current condition.
C. Determine any special requirements that need to be considered to
reach the best business decision.
Exhibit 3-2 (Page 2 of 7)
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PHASE 4 - IDENTIFY WORKLOADS :
A. Identify and prepare necessary conversions of continuing workloads.
(Preventative Maintenance, Inspections, Contracts, etc.)
PHASE 5 - TRANSITION COORDINATION :
A. Define customer needs, priorities, organizational values, and
expectations.
B. Brief customers and employees on procedures.
C. Identify and negotiate Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSAs).
PHASE 6 - ESTABLISH STAFF CIVIL ENGINEER (SCE) OFFICE :
A. Determine staff requirements for functions transferred.
B. Establish appropriate procedures.
PHASE 7 - DEVELOP IMPLEMENTATION PLAN - SUPPORT SERVICES :
A. Management Information Department - Coordinate PWC Management
Information System (MIS) implementation with functional phase-in plans.
Determine best interface with existing MIS.
B. Personnel Department - Assist in PWD employee briefings and
coordinate transfer of employee records with functional phase-in plans.
C. Financial Support - Assist with obtaining NAS§ funding
transfers and brief new customers on PWC funding procedures. Coordinate the
establishment of NASlMHMSCE cost accounting.
D. Administrative Support - Coordinate badging of transferring PWD/PWC
employees and guard mail services for functional areas transferred.
PHASE 8 - DEVELOP IMPLEMENTATION PLAN - MATERIAL SUPPORT/SHOP STORE :
A. Identify needed resources to open shop store (facilities, equipment,
personnel, etc.)
B. Coordinate material MIS implementation with various functional
phase-in plans.
C. Brief new customers on material processes and procedures.
D. Prepare transfer of personnel, facilities, equipment, tools and
plant property to open shop store.
Exhibit 3-2 (Page 3 of 7)
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E. Transfer resources.
F. Indoctrinate transferred employees.
PHASE 9 - DEVELOP IMPLEMENTATION PLAN - TRANSPORTATION :
A. Identify and evaluate existing procedures/processes and jointly
modify if required.
B. Develop/install transportation MIS.
C. Identify and establish on-site material support.
D. Review business decision/financial impacts.
E. Brief customers on work and financial processes.
F. Prepare transfer of personnel, facilities, equipment, tools and
plant property.
G. Transfer resources.
H. Indoctrinate transferred employees.
PHASE 10 - DEVELOP IMPLEMENTATION PLAN - HAZARDOUS WASTE :
A. Identify and evaluate existing procedures/processes and jointly
modify if required.
B. Develop/install MIS.
C. Identify and establish on-site material support.
D. Review business decision/financial impacts.
E. Brief customers on work and financial processes.
F. Prepare transfer of personnel, facilities, equipment, tools and
plant property.
G. Transfer resources.
H. Indoctrinate transferred employees.
PHASE 11 - DEVELOP IMPLEMENTATION PLAN - UTILITIES :
A. Identify and evaluate existing procedures/processes and jointly
modify if required.
Exhibit 3-2 (Page 4 of 7)
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B. Develop/install utilities MIS.
C. Identify and establish on-site material support.
D. Review business decision/financial impacts.
E. Brief customers on work and financial processes.
F. Prepare transfer of personnel, facilities, equipment, tools, utility
systems and plant property.
G. Transfer resources.
H. Indoctrinate transferred employees.
PHASE 12 - DEVELOP IMPLEMENTATION PLAN - MAINTENANCE:
A. Identify and evaluate existing procedures/processes and jointly
modify if required.
B. Develop/install maintenance MIS.
C. Identify and establish on-site material support.
D. Review business decision/financial impacts.
E. Brief customers on work and financial processes.
F. Prepare transfer of personnel, facilities, equipment, tools and
plant property.
PHASE 13 - IMPLEMENTATION FOLLOW-UP :
A. Review MIS implementation.
B. Review employee indoctrinations.
C. Review processes and procedures.
D. Review customer impacts.
Attached: Plan of Action & Milestones Gantt Chart
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This chapter analyzes each of the three case studies
presented in this thesis. Each case study teaching note is
divided into four sections. Section one consists of questions
that may help the student prepare the case, or may assist the
instructor with stimulating class discussion. Section two is
a summary of the case study. Section three lists various
major issues or problems associated with the case. Each issue
or problem is a potential avenue for analysis. Section four
is an analysis of the case in light of the major issues or
problems. The analysis utilizes pertinent theories and
related case facts.
B. CASE STUDY ONE TEACHING NOTE
1. Questions
• What is the situation?
• What is the Commander's assessment of the situation?
• Do you agree with his assessment? Explain.
• What is your assessment of the situation? Explain.
2 . Case Summary
The first section of the case series provides
background information concerning the Public Works Department,
NAS Kensington and CDR Alexander's first few months on board
lOf
as PWO. Descriptions of the department's mission, its
organization, its users, and its situation are provided.
Responsible for the facilities on board NAS Kensington, the
Public Works Department was faced with trimming down and
firming up in order to be competitive under the OMB Circular
A-76.
3. Major Issues/Problems
Three major issues/problems are apparent in this case
study. The first issue is one of privatization of the public
sector, specifically as seen in the OMB Circular A-76. The
overall theme of the Commercial Activities Study is to
commercialize all government activities that can be performed
by the civilian community. Secondly, PWD, NAS Kensington has
been under a CA study for five-plus years. This long drawn
out process has proven detrimental to the Department's morale
and productivity. Finally, an important aspect of any
strategic management issue should be an assessment of one's
internal and external environments. This is better known as
a SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and
threats) . It helps define the "tools" one has to work with
and the barriers to overcome.
4. Analysis
a. Situation
CDR Alexander reports aboard NAS Kensington as
Public Works Officer just prior to a major milestone of an OSD
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mandated CA study (i.e., the deadline for the Department's MEO
submission). Though left with his predecessor's
recommendations, CDR Alexander was now the one responsible for
the submission of a fair and accurate, yet competitive bid.
The MEO must represent a streamlined organization that can
still perform its intended mission. To ignore the situation
or to submit an inaccurate or uncompetitive bid potentially
could mean the dissolution of the Public Works Department as
it currently operates.
b. The Commander's Assessment
CDR Alexander identified the strategic issue as the
following. How does one put together an MEO that is
competitive yet is capable of providing improved customer
service?
To address this strategic issue he had two choices:
one, go with his predecessor's proposed MEO, or two, put
together his own MEO. His first step in the process was to
evaluate his predecessor's recommendation.
CDR Alexander 's initial assessment ("gut reaction")
was that the proposed MEO would be unsuccessful. He bases
this initial problem definition on the fact that the proposed
MEO's organizational structure is functional (the same as the
current organization) and does not resemble examples from
private industry or shipyards which have proven successful.
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In an effort to verify his initial hypothesis, CDR
Alexander gathers further data. An assessment of the data
leads the Commander to stand by his initial problem definition
(i.e., the current functional organization was not providing
adequate customer service, therefore, the proposed functional
MEO would be inadequate) . He therefore chooses to put
together his own.
c. Author's Analysis
It is clear in this case that action had to be
taken to satisfy and finally complete the lengthy and
unsettling CA study. The Commander appears to attack the
situation head on and in a logical manner. Unfortunately
though, we as Naval Officers are all too often required to
respond to such short notice "emergencies" that we neglect to
(or do not have the time or resources to) be thorough in our
data gathering. This seems to be the case here. CDR
Alexander collects the data required to verify his initial
hypothesis but does not seem to assess his department's
internal and external environments completely. If he had, he
may have developed a different problem definition.
The Commander could have improved his data
gathering and analysis process by following an approach
developed by Dr. John M. Bryson in his book Strategic Planning
for Public and Nonprofit Organizations . Dr. Bryson presents
an eight-step strategic planning process that is based on
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strategic issues management (see Exhibit 4-1) . Of particular
use in this case are steps 1 through 6.
Step 1. CDR Alexander is the most logical
initiator of the analysis process, and is the final decision
authority for the Department. In his analysis process he
should consider input from all members of his organization.
The Commander's key decision makers should include the
Commanding Officer of the station (he is the final decision
authority for the station) and all of his division directors
(they are the driving force for their divisions)
.
Step 2. In this particular case, the overriding
mandate at the time is clear—make Public Works efficient and
effective enough to under bid the local contractors or face
dissolution of the department.
Step 3. The organization's mission is clear as
well—maintain and repair the station's facilities.
Step 4. Of particular interest during this time
frame are the political, economic, and social forces and
trends. The DoD has just experienced a period of great growth
under President Reagan. The current year, 1988, is an
election year though, and very shortly the country will be
under the leadership of a new president. The outlook is for
continued military support but with decreasing expansion.
Economically the nation is in a period of growth
but again is looking to level off soon. The budget deficit is
the largest ever and continues to grow.
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Blue collar workers are on the decrease. More and
more young people are turning to the service industry and
white collar work. If this trend continues fewer laborers
will be available to perform specialized maintenance work. A
"jack of all trades" will be in demand.
Step 5. Internally the department does not have an
abundance of resources (personnel, economic,
material/equipment) to draw upon or a record of performance
worth emulating.
The department is "short" 14 civilian personnel.
And the personnel that they do have are significantly older
than most work forces, which has meant excessive absences due
to poor health.
Funds are finite and are generally less than is
needed to accomplish everything requested by the other NAS
departments and the various tenant commands.
It is evident from the numerous findings listed in
Exhibit 1-8 that the department is sorely lacking in the area
of supplies both materials and equipment, and that there is
significant room for improvement in the area of performance.
Many of the findings indicate a lack of motivation on the part
of the worker, and a significant amount of wasted effort—both
intentional idleness and that due to poor or no planning.
Step 6. CDR Alexander is faced with a two-part
strategic issue—What is the best way to put together a MEO
that is competitive yet capable of fulfilling it mission of
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facility maintenance and repair, while facing increasing
budget cuts and resource shortfalls?
The next step in the process is to formulate a
strategy to deal with the issue identified in Step 6.
Unfortunately, the information in the case does not provide
one with enough data to thoroughly assess the situation.
Therefore, it is difficult to even say whether the Commander
should have gone with the proposed MEO or not.
Following are issues that should have been
considered so as to better evaluate the situation. What is
the labor distribution to the difficulty of the task
performed? Is the maintenance division "top heavy?" Is there
a disproportionate amount of journeymen? What is the level of
expertise reguired to accomplish the majority of the work? Is
the work being done properly the first time or is rework
required? How many workers are needed to complete the average
work request? How many workers are actually sent to do a job?
Can trips to and from job sites be reduced? Can work be
assigned such that all the jobs in one area can be taken care
of in the minimum number of trips?
Though the consideration of cost reduction is the
most pressing part of the strategic issue at hand, one must
temper it with the fulfillment of the mission (i.e., customer
service) . A careful evaluation of the cost reductions is
required in light of how it will effect service. Once armed
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with this information a more informed definition of the
problem could have been reached.
C. CASE STUDY TWO TEACHING NOTE
1. Questions
• Describe the Commander's strategy.
• Was organizational restructuring the most appropriate
strategy?
• What alternative strategy would you recommend?
• Describe and critique the Commander's implementation of
the MEO.
2 . Case Summary
This case covers the time frame of August 1990 through
September 1991. The major event that occurred was CDR
Alexander's implementation of his proposed MEO (i.e., a RIF
and reorganization) . Changes within the department included
the demotion of a number of Maintenance and Utilities Division
workers, and the transition from a centralized, functional
organization to a more decentralized, product/market
organization. The workers having been grouped with others in
their area of expertise are now spilt and assigned to
"regional companies;" their discomfort level is high; their
morale is low.
3. Major Issues/Problems
There are two major issues that are evident in case
two. The first one deals with the Commander's choice of
strategies given the environment. In order to be effective,
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a strategy must satisfy several criteria, not the least of
which is that it must address the given strategic issue (s).
It must be technically workable, politically acceptable to
key stakeholders, and must accord with the organization's
philosophy and core values. It should be ethical, moral,
and legal. It must also deal with the strategic issue it
was supposed to address. [Ref. 10:p. 60]
The second issue is on of the Commander's implementation of
the MEO, the steps taken and its effectiveness.
4. Analysis
a. The Commander's Strategy
CDR Alexander stands by his initial assessment and
chooses to revamp his predecessor's proposed MEO by
restructuring the organization and reducing in grade a number
of workers. The purpose of restructuring was to improve
customer service while the grade reductions were to reduce
costs.
Jb. Most Appropriate Choice?
Based on the environmental assessment completed in
the analysis of Case One and on the after action comments of
the Commander's staff and workers (in Case Two), the
restructuring of the organization was questionable.
It was imperative that the Commander reduce costs
while maintaining or increasing customer service. He appears
to address both of these issues, but does he really?
The term product/market is used here to describe a
type of organizational structure in which "divisions are
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organized according to individual products, product groups,
services, regions, markets, customers, or major programs."
[Ref. 9:p. 234]
In this particular case the distinguishing feature
of the product/market structure is that the Maintenance and
Utilities Division has been grouped based on geographical
regions. For each region, all the necessary trades should be
represented and fully staffed. The product/market structure
in theory promotes flexibility and adaptability within each of
the regional companies. Coordination across the trades within
each company is maximized which means work requests that
require multiple trades should be completed quicker. If fully
functional this type of structure would enhance customer
service with better response times, and since each region has
its own team the customer is able to contact the right foreman
and achieve satisfaction. [Ref. 9:pp. 234-235]
The key to the success of such a structure is to be
fully staffed. A review of CDR Alexander's organization
(Exhibit 2-3) shows that because of demotions (i.e., the need
to reduce costs) and personnel shortages due to a DoD wide
hiring freeze he does not have a full compliment of tradesmen
in each regional company. This leaves each company incapable
of fulfilling its mission without the use of members from the
other teams. The benefits of the product/market structure are
therefore negated because of the extensive coordination now
required across teams.
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It is also important to note that for each team to
be fully staffed with all of the trades means a duplication of
personnel. Duplication of personnel potentially means an
increase in costs not a decrease.
To reorganize without a full staff will result in
the failure of the system to perform as designed; to
reorganize with a full staff will result in higher personnel
costs. The action of organizing the Maintenance and Utilities
Division in a product/market structure is contradictory to the
two-part strategic issue faced by the Department, and is
therefore not the most appropriate alternative given the
environmental constraints.
c. Alternative Strategy
The most constraining element of the strategic
issue is that of costs. This should be the focus of any
alternative solution.
Though not strongly indicated in the case it
appears from the Commander's explanation to his new APWO that
indeed the Maintenance and Utilities Division is "top heavy"
but not necessarily overmanned. Therefore the Commander's
action of downgrading various positions is advisable. This
would reduce costs while maintaining an adequate base of
workers from which to draw.
In order to become more efficient and effective
(better customer service) one could concentrate on various
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areas of the work request process, i.e., prioritization and
scheduling, and the dispatch/coordination of workers, tasks,
and locations.
Utilizing the priorities assigned to the work
requests (as described in Exhibit 1-2) and interface with a
designated customer representative the Department could
institute and maintain a monthly schedule of work requests.
The key to success with this is to not deviate from the
schedule unless it is an absolute emergency. The biggest
challenge to keeping to the schedule is the RHIP alluded to by
a couple of the workers in the case. Base C.O.'s are
notoriously the worst for interrupting schedules and demanding
"frivolous" projects be done. Dollars are too tight; C.O.'s
must be tactfully educated on opportunity costs.
In conjunction with scheduling, the workers should
be coordinated and assigned groups of tasks that are in one
particular area. This obviously requires communication
between shop foreman, the scheduler, and the customer, but a
few minutes spent planning can save hours of wasted effort
later.
Another element necessary to make scheduling and
coordination successful is cooperation and coordination with
the Supply Department. In order to accomplish most tasks the
workers require materials or supplies of some sort. By
knowing what work is upcoming (via prioritization and
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scheduling) materials can be ordered in advance and be on hand
for use when needed.
In this way the immediate necessity of reducing
costs is accomplished, and the concern of customer service can
be addressed and fine tuned as required. Then, if future
budgets allow and increased customer service is still desired,
a product/market structure could be implemented.
d. Implementation
The case gives us very little in the way of details
as to the Commander's process of implementation. We do know
that monthly meetings were held and that all levels of the
organization were made aware of what was happening and when it
was going to happen.
The key ingredient that seems to have been
overlooked was "why" (i.e., the vision). The goal of the
vision is to motivate. It should "emphasize purposes,
behavior, performance criteria, decision rules, and standards
that are public serving, rather than self-serving." [Ref.
10:p. 186]
Undoubtedly the Commander had a vision of success
for his department, but it was unfortunately not passed on to
his staff or workers. "A vision of success can have little
effect if the organizational members are kept in the dark
about it." [Ref. 10:p. 186]
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D. CASE STUDY THREE TEACHING NOTE
1. Questions
• Describe the situation.
• Evaluate the situation (i.e., what course of action would
you take given the situation?)
2 . Case Summary
This final case brings us to the departure of CDR
Alexander. His relief reports aboard and finds that he is
faced with an OSD mandate to turn over his department's
activities to PWC Edgewater in a move to consolidate DoD base
engineering services.
3. Major Issues/Problems
The most evident and all encompassing issues include
the OSD mandate to consolidate and the fact that it comes so
closely on the heels of the MEO implementation. The
Department is faced with another stressful and disruptive
change. The workers have yet to adjust to the last one.
Successful change management will be a must.
4. Analysis
a. Situation
In response to the increasing cutbacks in the
Defense Department's budget and personnel structure, OSD
published a number of different Defense Management Report
Decisions, one of which, DMRD No. 967, addresses base
engineering services (Public Works) . A team of OSD and
Service military and civilian experts determined that savings
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and increased efficiencies are possible through consolidation.
For PWD Kensington this means a takeover by (consolidation
with) PWC Edgewater.
Only four months after the implementation of a
major RIF and reorganization, PWD Kensington is once again
faced with uncertain times and a potentially more disturbing
change on the horizon.
b. Author's Evaluation
For the purpose of a classroom discussion one could
evaluate or critigue the DMRD based on various issues such as:
• Does the solution "work" for saving money?; fulfilling the
mission?; satisfying the stakeholders?
• Does it help prioritize the work? Who prioritizes?
• Is "saving money" a fair assumption?
• Is consolidation really an "innovative" solution?
• Does the "solution" deal with the causes or does it merely
treat the symptoms?
• Is the solution "right" for PWD Kensington?; PWC
Edgewater?
As the PWO in this situation these questions may be
interesting and intriguing, but one must at times recognize
when situations can be changed and when they just must be
reckoned with. In the pecking order of the DoD organization,
the Commander is not in a position to influence a change in
OSD policy. OSD has said to consolidate, and consolidate he
must do. He is not without choice though—how to manage the
transition is now the strategic issue. He can sit back and
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just let the change take its course, or he can be an active
participant and facilitate the change in his organization.
An effective approach to facilitating the change is
to look at the situation as strategic issue management. Once
again the Bryson model of strategic planning (Exhibit 4-1) is
a useful model to utilize.
Each step should be evaluated and a SWOT analysis
performed with the changes and new issues in mind. OSD's
mandate to consolidate changes the "Department's" mission and
entire outlook on its environment. Most of the concerns
identified in the original planning process cease to exist for
PWD once consolidation occurs. One particular concern,
though, that must continue to be addressed, particularly in
light of another change is the people. The workers are
already unmotivated, unhappy and bitter from the last change.
A significant effort must be made to stimulate and encourage
them as they transition from PWD over to PWC.
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AN EIGHT-STEP STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS
[Source: Ref. 10:pp. 48-61]
The process is illustrated on page two of this exhibit and is further described below.
Step 1 -Initiating and agreeing on a strategic planning process. An individual or group must
initiate the process. The key decision makers and the players who should be involved in the
effort need to be identified, and an initial agreement reached.
Step 2-Clarifying organizational mandates. Mandates, both formal and informal, are "the
musts" that an organization faces. These may appear in such things as legislation, municipal
law, and/or contracts.
Step 3-Clarifying organizational mission and values. The organization's mission along with
its mandates serves to justify its existence. By clarifying the organization's purpose
unnecessary conflict can be avoided, and discussions and activities can be channeled
productively.
Step 4-Assesing the external environment. The opportunities and threats facing an
organization can be identified by analyzing the environment outside of the organization.
These can be determined by observing various forces and trends-political, economical,
technological, and social.
Step 5—Assesing the internal environment. Internal factors are those under the control of the
organization, and include "resources" (personnel, supplies, equipment), "present strategy"
(process), and "performance" (the outside of the organization). The evaluation of such
internal factors will reveal the organization's strengths and weaknesses.
Step 6-Identifying the strategic issues facing an organization. The main goal of strategic
planning is to achieve the best "fit" between an organization and its environment. Thus the
combination of the first five steps leads to the identification of strategic issues (i.e., the basic
policy questions that affect an organization's mandates, mission and values, and internal and
external environment).
Step 7-Formulating strategies to manage the issues. Strategies vary by organizational level
and function, and by time frame. Basically, though, they are a collection of elements such as
programs, polices, and actions that set forth what an organization is, what it is to accomplish,
and why it exists.
Step 8- Establishing an effective organizational vision for the future. The final step is to
develop a description of what the organization should look like when it successfully utilizes its
strategies and reaches its full potential. "A challenging yet achievable vision embodies the
tension between what an organization wants and what it can have." [Ref. 10:p. 61]
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1. Primary Research Question
What is the best way to reorganize in a changing
environment? Tom Peters in his book Thriving On Chaos would
have us believe there is a cookbook solution. He even titled
his index "Prescriptions for a World Turned Upside Down."
Unfortunately, as is evidenced in this thesis case study
series, no such "prescription" for success exists, and the
most accurate answer is— it depends. There is no one best
way; it depends on the situation.
Each situation is unique; never before and never again
will the exact situation, circumstances, or mix of people and
conditions exist. Similar, but not exact. Because of this it
is important to study theories and other's application of them
(so as to have a base of knowledge from which to draw) but it
is imperative to learn and understand a process by which a
situation can be analyzed.
The process used in this thesis was Bryson's model of
strategic issues management (as presented in Exhibit 4-1) . A
process is not a "magic formula" in and of itself, but is
instead a tool to be used to assist in decision making.
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It should also be noted that the application of any
management theory is only done after a careful and complete
analysis has been completed. Too frequently we all suffer
from what I'll call the hammer and nail syndrome. That is, we
learn how to apply one particular management tool (the hammer)
and begin to "solve" every management problem (the nail) we
come across with that one tool. This, like using a hammer to
tighten a water pipe, is not always the most effective way to
accomplish our task or solve our problem.
2 . Secondary Research Questions
The answer to who should be involved and what factors
or inputs should be considered when reorganizing is perhaps a
bit more concrete—everyone and everything (pertinent to the
organization)
.
An organization is in essence a team; to accomplish
their mission a team must work together towards the same
outcome. It is, therefore, important that all members of the
organization have input into the decision making process.
Understandably, not everyone will "get his way," but if given
"ownership" in the process they will more likely support the
final decision made.
We see in this case a number of comments from both the
workers and staff that they felt left out and betrayed, and
that they did not know why things were changed the way they
had been.
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Another important consideration is what factors or
inputs to consider in the decision making process. As stated
above, everything pertinent to the organization/situation is
a contender. One of the particular strengths of Bryson's
process is its all encompassing look at influential factors
both internal and external to the organization.
PWD Kensington was faced with an external threat of
competition and an internal strategy of customer service.
Under ideal conditions the two could have been satisfied.
Unfortunately ideal conditions did not exist and other
external threats and internal weaknesses that had been
overlooked were detrimental to the organization. It appears
the Commander lacked the tool to help him better diagnose the
situation.
B. FUTURE STUDY
Two separate and distinct items present themselves as
potential topics of study.
The first is a continuation of Case Study Two, i.e., a
look at the "team" concept in a Public Works Department. If
the conditions had been more conducive, would a product/market
organization structure have been successful? Have other PWDs
tried this same type of approach? If so, were they
successful?
Secondly, and potentially controversial, further study is
called for in Case Study Three. Is consolidation which is
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intended to introduce economies of scale, actually more
efficient and cost effective? CAPT Hughes has postulated
that:
Economies of scale go unchallenged because the men who
make the decisions - at the top - want to believe in them.
Economists know that a point is reached when the
inefficiencies of bigness overcome the economies. The
compulsion to consolidate for the sake of power will in
time build almost any organization beyond the critical
mass into an inefficient bureaucracy. [Ref. 11: p. 3]
Even the initial evidence available in Case Three for PWD
"Kensington" indicates that expenses will go up, not down. 2
Is this true for all bases being consolidated under DMRD No.
967? Or will some bases see an increase in costs while others
will experience a decrease so that overall DoD will experience
a decrease in costs? These are vital questions; the DMRD is
built upon the assumption that consolidation will save DoD
money, albeit five percent. Thus a conflict appears to exist
that should be addressed—does consolidation produce
"economies" of scale or "diseconomies" of scale?
2 As seen in Exhibit 3-3 the PWD Comptroller Budget Analyst
estimates a $14 million shortfall in FY 93.
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